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Current issue : #73 | Release date : 2026-11-17 | Editor : Phrack Staff
IntroductionPhrack Staff
Phrack Prophile on Halvar FlakePhrack Staff
LinenoisePhrack Staff
Escaping from a Docker container through vDSOandersonc0d3
Owning the Truth: Undecidability, unsound kernels, and the forging of proofendrazine, veorq
Cryptographic Ideas for TCC BypassesJonathan Bar Or
Word Machines for Weird Machinesnoperator
Beyond the Facade :: Exposing Smart GiantsLiquidWorm
The Art of Staying HiddenMatheuZSecurity
Reflections on Trusting AI: A Virus Inside an LLMmarver
QNX Userland Shellcode ComponentsClaes M Sjoberg
UAF Exploitation in the Sheaves Eraw1sdom
From PhrackCTF to Two WinFsp 0-daysLucas Tay
fortify-headers: standalone portable header-based implementation of FORTIFY_SOURCE=3jvoisin, sin
Poor Little ChunksAx
The Silent Fleet: AUVs -- Autonomous Underwater VehiclesAmitay Dan
MOLE - A Binary Ninja Plugin for Static Taint AnalysisDamian Pfammatter
Backdoor attacks against Machine Learning IRLG. Cherubin
A Journey Into Kernel Exploit Development in the LLM EraJuefei Pu, Yifan Wu, Kareem Shehada, Zhiyun Qian
Abusing the Windows Smart Card Minidriver ArchitectureMarc Barrantes
Painting Out of the Box: Escaping the Chromium Renderer Sandbox via SkiaQuang Luong
Semantic Abuse of the Linux IIO SubsystemSalah Triki
Disassembly, Flux, and Runtime Hijinksfoosc
Mystique - An x86 Metamorphic CompilerwK
Security is failure: Every Patch Is a GuessTedsig42
The Moon vs The Shield: A Study of Heap Feng Shui Using Lua3nso
HISTORY: Phrack World HistoryPhrack Staff
HISTORY: The 2000 SSH1 exploit that broke the Internetlcamtuf, scut, dvorak, scrippie, portal, gera, skyper
HISTORY: The 2003 Linux Kernel BackdoorAnonymous
HISTORY: BlueBoxing - Myths and Feelingsgamma, skyper
HISTORY: The Proxy That Made No SenseMikko Hypponen

Title : The Silent Fleet: AUVs -- Autonomous Underwater Vehicles

Author : Amitay Dan
     |=-  The Silent Fleet                                         -=|
     |=-  Research Underwater Vehicles Exposed to the Internet     -=|
     |=-  AUVs -- Autonomous Underwater Vehicles                   -=|

||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

     |=[ Author  ]=---[ Amitay Dan <popshark1 att gmail dott com> ]-=|
     |=[ Contact ]=---[ amitaydan.com                             ]-=|
     |=[ Date    ]=---[ June 2026 (research: 2018)                ]-=|
============================================================================

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Table of Contents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

  0x01  Introduction
  0x02  Background, Methodology, and Vessels
  0x03  The Weapon: Slocum Glider AUV
  0x04  Dock Server Hardware -- Ground Control to Major Tom
  0x05  Findings
      0x05.a  Unrestricted Web Console Access
      0x05.b  Open Iridium Satellite API
      0x05.c  Plaintext FTP -- Full Filesystem Exposed
      0x05.d  Java Web Start Code Injection (MitM)
      0x05.e  One-Packet DoS
      0x05.f  "Light Encoding" != Encryption
      0x05.g  Real-Time GPS Tracking
      0x05.h  Default Credentials + Indexed Forum
  0x06  A Decade, Three Generations, Zero Security Change
  0x07  The New System (SFMC) -- Still Searchable
  0x08  Recommendations
  0x09  Conclusion
  0x0A  Full Disclosure
  0x0B  References

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  0x01. Introduction


What drives someone to deploy autonomous underwater vehicles to the open
sea with zero security? Unlike a server whose password can be reset, these
are research tools that function like underwater satellites. If one locks
up because someone forgot a password, years of academic work are
destroyed. That tension -- security vs. operability -- is baked into the
architecture.

This paper documents a systematic OSINT sweep that located more than
13 active Dock Servers (the shore-side command control for Slocum Gliders)
exposed on the open internet, across six countries, managing 25+ deployed
vehicles. 12 of 13 required zero authentication. The findings span eight
distinct vulnerability classes, from unauthenticated web consoles to
Man-in-the-Middle Java code injection and full control of the glider.

The vehicles are dual-use. The U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFCC)
explicitly lists them for Amphibious Warfare (AMW), Mine Warfare (MIW),
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Special Operations support.  In 2016, a
Chinese Navy vessel seized an identical Slocum Glider belonging to the
U.S. Navy in the South China Sea. The lesson was not learned.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

  ABSTRACT

  The Glider Mission Control (GMC) infrastructure -- C2 for the
  Slocum autonomous underwater glider -- was accessible from the
  open internet at universities and research institutions for
  many years without authentication.

  A hostile actor could: track glider GPS in real time, exfiltrate
  scientific data, issue navigation commands, upload malicious
  mission files, brick the science computer, and pivot into the
  host institution's network all without exploits.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  0x02. Background, Methodology, and Vessels


The Slocum Glider is designed and manufactured by Teledyne Webb Research
(Falmouth, MA). It propels itself by cycling buoyancy -- a ballast motor
shifts the center of mass, the wings convert vertical motion into
horizontal glide. in some models no propeller others has others has hybrid
abilities with propellor and cycling buoyancy. Up to 1,000 m depth.
Missions can last months.

Communication happens when the vehicle surfaces every few hours and dials
home over Iridium satellite (RUDICS). The shore-side endpoint is the Dock
Server -- a Linux box running Glider Mission Control (GMC) software. From
GMC, operators plan missions, push waypoint files, download science data,
and monitor vehicle state.

Relevant threat context:

AMW   - Amphibious Warfare: landing forces from sea
MIW   - Mine Warfare: mine detection and emplacement
ASW   - Anti-Submarine Warfare: hunting submarines
SOCOM - Special Operations integration

The official operator manual explicitly tells users NOT to enable glider
authentication:

............................................................................

  "Glider Authentication

   Gliders connecting to a dock server via Iridium RUDICS may
   optionally be required to authenticate before being allowed
   access to the dock server.  Unless there are compelling reasons
   to require glider authentication, it is recommended NOT to use
   this capability.

   It is difficult enough to communicate with a glider at sea
   without the additional hurdle of a login sequence.  It
   increases the probability that a glider at sea will be
   incommunicado due to misconfiguration, software error,
   corrupt file, lost password, etc."

   -- Slocum Gliders Operator Manual (official documentation)

............................................................................

  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  0x03. The Target: Slocum Glider AUV


The Slocum Glider is not a toy. A yellow cylinder roughly 2 m long and 20
cm in diameter, it travels at ~0.5 knots consuming milliwatts. It can
carry CTD sensors, acoustic modems, hydrophones, or whatever payload the
mission demands.

From the surface it cannot be distinguished from ocean debris. It surfaces
for ~2 minutes per dive cycle, transmits via Iridium, and submerges again.
An attacker watching the satellite call log knows exactly when and where
to intercept it.

  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  0x04. Dock Server Hardware -- Ground Control to Major Tom


Every Slocum deployment relies on a shore-side server running GMC (Glider
Mission Control). This Linux box:

- Accepts inbound Iridium RUDICS TCP connections from gliders
- Serves the web management console (port 80 / 443)
- Exposes an FTP server for file exchange with gliders
- Distributes Java Web Start (JNLP) control applications
- Stores all mission data, GPS logs, and satellite call records

The Dock Server is the single point of control for every vehicle it
manages. Compromise the Dock Server; own the fleet.

  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  0x05. Findings


  ---[ 0x05.a - Unrestricted Web Console Access ]---

Discovery: A Censys search for the string "Webb Research Glider Mission
Control" returned 12 unique IPv4 addresses. Cross-referenced with Shodan,
ZoomEye, and FOFA, plus Google Dorks ("GLMPC Terminal", "Glider
Terminal"), the final list was 13+ active Dock Servers across 6 countries.

  Exposed organizations (partial list):

  [    USA     ]  Mote Marine Laboratory (FL)
  [    USA     ]  Oregon State University (Backup)
  [    USA     ]  Skidaway Institute / Univ. of Georgia
  [ AUSTRALIA  ]  CSIRO (national science agency)
  [SOUTH KOREA ]  Kyungpook National University
  [NEW ZEALAND ]  REANNZ research network

12 of 13 servers required zero authentication. No username, no password,
no token. One browser request --> full console access:

- Active glider list with real-time status
- Satellite call history
- Mission control buttons
- All operational data

The one server with a barrier used HTTP Basic Auth ("Restricted Files").
Not IP restriction. Not VPN. Basic auth over HTTPS.

Visible glider names: mote-genie, kg_557, unit_416, ramses, pelagia, bob.
The naming convention "ramses" is a name worth noting.

  ---[ 0x05.b - Open Iridium Satellite API ]---

Every Dock Server exposed an unauthenticated CGI endpoint returning the
complete Iridium satellite call log:

  .-----------------------------------------------------------------.
  | GET /cgi-bin/gmc/list-iridium-results.pl?time=365               |
  |                                                                 |
  | Returns: timestamp (epoch + human), glider ID, call duration    |
  | No auth. No rate limit. ?time= accepts any integer.             |
  '-----------------------------------------------------------------'

The Skidaway Institute server (Univ. of Georgia) exposed 1,770 calls over
a single year.

Analysis of glider "pelagia" showed surfacing every ~7 minutes -- classic
Pitch Mechanism Failure. Same signature in kg_557 (South Korea): "pitch
not commanded" errors repeating for 7 days straight.

An actor could monitor this feed to predict surfacing windows and
intercept the vehicle at a known GPS position.

  ---[ 0x05.c - Plaintext FTP -- Full Filesystem Exposed ]---

GMC FTP Utility (based on FTP-Go v1.6) connects to the Dock Server via
plaintext FTP. No SFTP. No TLS. Credentials and data in the clear.

FTP root directory contents:

  /
  |-- to-glider/      <- WRITE: push mission files (.ma) to vehicle
  |   |-- *.ma            (waypoints, behaviors, commands)
  |
  |-- from-glider/    <- raw vehicle data
  |-- from-science/   <- raw science payload data
  |-- dockserver.conf <- server config, cleartext
  |-- gliderState.xml <- real-time status, >100 KB
  `-- surface.dat     <- per-surfacing network logs

Attacker could make new missions new routes  and cancel previous missions
and routes. Moreover Attackers were able to force security and add
passwords, so original operator will be out of control.


  ---[ 0x05.d - Java Web Start Code Injection (MitM) ]---

All the GMC control tools (Glider Terminal, GLMPC Terminal, Data
Visualizer) are distributed as Java Web Start (JNLP) packages served over
plain HTTP. The JAR files carry:

  <security>
    <all-permissions/>
  </security>
  <j2se version="1.1+"/>

MitM position --> swap the JAR --> full OS execution on researcher
workstation:

- Malware persistence
- Credential harvesting
- Lateral movement into university / lab internal network

Java Web Start was deprecated in Java 11 (Sept 2018). These systems
required legacy Java 8, a version with a backlog of CVEs. Same attack
surface applies to file uploads targeting the science computer.

  ---[ 0x05.e - One-Packet DoS ]---

From the official Dock Server User Guide v7.14 (2013):

  ,-----------------------------------------------------------------.
  | "When Dock Server launches, it opens serial ports and network   |
  |  sockets. At any time, these resources can be owned by only a   |
  |  single process... do not start more than one instance."        |
  '-----------------------------------------------------------------'

The Glider Terminal socket accepts inbound connections without auth. One
TCP connect from an attacker --> socket is owned --> legitimate research
team cannot communicate with their vehicle for the duration of the
connection.

No CVE. No exploit. Just: nc <target> <port>.

  ---[ 0x05.f - "Light Encoding" != Encryption ]---

FTP-Go documentation states all server credentials are stored with "light
encoding" -- their term for obfuscation, not cryptographic encryption.

One tested server (Australian organization): Application Lock set to
"Leave unlocked". All FTP credentials for all managed Dock Servers stored
in a single unprotected, trivially-decoded file.

  ---[ 0x05.g - Real-Time GPS Tracking ]---

Event logs on FTP contain precise GPS coordinates for every surfacing
event, timestamped to the second:

Combined with the Iridium call API: full real-time tracking of every
deployed glider, globally, from any browser, with no credentials.

This is not theoretical. China physically seized an identical U.S. Navy
Slocum Glider in the South China Sea (Dec 2016). The vehicle was returned
after diplomatic protest. The surfacing pattern and GPS data were publicly
visible on the exposed Dock Servers.

  ---[ 0x05.h - Default Credentials + Indexed Forum ]---

Evidence of unchanged factory credentials and hardcoded passwords found
across multiple servers.

Official support forum (datahost.webbresearch.com) had no robots.txt.  All
troubleshooting discussions, operational configurations, and support
tickets indexed by Google. Query:

  site:datahost.webbresearch.com

Official manual section 14.3.1.3 confirms the PAM authentication design is
deliberately left non-functional:

"...support is NOT available from Webb Research Corporation. If you do not
know how to create a user account, you should not configure gliders to
authenticate. If you cannot reconfigure PAM without help, you should not
change it."

  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  0x06. A Decade, Three Generations, Zero Security Change


  Year  Event                        Notes
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------
  2010  G1 released                  Plaintext FTP. No auth. HTTP JARs.
  2012  G2 released                  Same architecture. Same vulns.
  2013  GMC v7.14                    DoS documented in official manual.
  2014  G2 Training Guide            Same
  2016  China seizes Navy AUV        South China Sea. Identical vehicle.
  2017  G3 released                  Same architecture. Same vulns.
  2018  This research                13+ servers found globally.
  2018  Initial disclosure           22.09.2018 to Teledyne Webb Research.
                                     Phone call with no official response
  2023  New system improved security
  2024  Follow-up disclosure         22.01.2024. No response.
  2025  Slocum G3S
  2026  Publication                  Responsible disclosure. Most patched.

Across three hardware generations and seven years of official
documentation, not one substantive change to the security architecture.
The plaintext FTP, the absent auth, the HTTP-served JARs -- present in G1
(2010), present in G3 (2017).

  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  0x07. The New System (SFMC) -- Still Searchable


Teledyne Webb Research eventually produced Slocum Fleet Mission Control
(SFMC), which adds HTTPS and a login form. It is findable with:

  Shodan/Censys/Fofa: "/sfmc/login"
                      "/sfmc/login" && title=="SFMC - Login"
                      "/sfmc/about"

  Satellite call logs (no GPS, but operational metadata):
    <target>/sfmc/iridium-calls

Dozens of SFMC instances remain internet-exposed. The security model is
"username + password, no VPN required." Modern operational guides now
require periodic password changes.

In the balance between operability and security -- operability still
leads. The conceptual gap remains.

  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  0x08. Recommendations to the old system


  [CRITICAL]
    * Put GMC/SFMC behind VPN or institutional IP whitelist.
    * Authenticate ALL CGI endpoints including the Iridium API.
    * Replace factory/default credentials immediately.

  [HIGH]
    * Replace FTP with SFTP or SCP for all transfers.
    * Serve JNLP/JAR over HTTPS with valid TLS cert.
    * Retire Java Web Start; use modern authenticated web UI.
    * Require auth before accepting Glider Terminal TCP connections.

  [MEDIUM]
    * Enable FTP-Go Application Lock with strong password.
    * OpSec policy: do not expose real-time GPS externally.

  [LOW]
    * Add robots.txt to support forum.

  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  0x09. Conclusion


The Slocum gliders are an engineering achievement. Quiet machines that
traverse the oceans and return knowledge -- maritime satellites with
wings. Their Command and Control was built with the mindset of an open
academic laboratory, not a system controlling dual-use assets at sea.

The developer documented the insecurity. The clients deployed without even
minimum hardening. When notified, the response was that the vehicle "is
like a turtle that sails very slowly and you can't hurt it." This
statement was made after China physically seized an identical vessel.

If you want to damage academic research, steal commercial secrets, or
locate dual-use research platforms for collection -- these naive
assumptions are the foundation that makes it possible.

  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  0x0A. Full Disclosure


Outreach to Teledyne Webb Research was made multiple times over several
years. The remediation timeline:

22.09.2018 -- First response from company. Followed by emails and a direct
              phone call with the systems manager.
2018-2023  -- No official statement. Users continued operating unsecured
              vehicles.
22.01.2024 -- Second outreach to InfoSec department. No response.
June 2026  -- Publication. Most clients have updated.

This article was originally written in 2018 and withheld given the
dual-use sensitivity of the vehicles. It is published now because the
majority of affected systems have been remediated.

  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  0x0B. References


[1]  Slocum G1 Glider Manual (2010)
     https://gliderfs.coas.oregonstate.edu/gliderweb/docs/
     slocum_manuals/Slocum_G1_Glider_Manual.pdf

[2]  Slocum G2 Operators Manual Rev.B (2012)
     https://gliderfs.coas.oregonstate.edu/gliderweb/docs/
     slocum_manuals/Slocum_G2_Glider_Operators_Manual.pdf

[3]  Slocum G2 Operators Training Guide (2014)
     https://gliderfs.coas.oregonstate.edu/gliderweb/docs/
     slocum_manuals/Slocum_Glider_Operators_Training_Guide.pdf

[4]  Slocum Glider Operators Guidebook (2010)
     https://wiki-pnb.eri.ucsb.edu/images/f/f2/
     Glider_operators_handbook.pdf

[5]  Slocum G3 Operators Manual Rev.2 (2017)
     https://gliderfs.coas.oregonstate.edu/gliderweb/docs/
     slocum_manuals/Slocum_G3_Operator_Manual_20171219.pdf

[6]  GMC Dock Server User Guide Rev 7.14 (2013)
     https://dockserver.skio.uga.edu/gmc/gmcUserGuide.pdf

[7]  Censys query
     https://censys.io/ipv4?q="Webb+Research+Glider+Mission+Control"

[8]  Shodan query
     https://www.shodan.io/search?query=
     "Webb+Research+Glider+Mission+Control"

[9]  ZoomEye query
     https://www.zoomeye.org/searchResult?q=
     %22Webb%20Research%20Glider%20Mission%20Control%22

[10] TWR Forum
     https://datahost.webbresearch.com

[11] A Hometown Glider Makes World News
     https://www.capenews.net/falmouth/news/
     a-hometown-glider-makes-world-news/

[12] China Gives Drone Back -- But Why Did They Grab It?
     https://www.twz.com/6604/china-gives-drone-back-but-why-
     did-they-grab-it-in-the-first-place

[13] Pentagon Press Secretary Statement
     https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/1032611/

[14] United States Fleet Forces Command (Wikipedia)
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Fleet_Forces_Command

[15] Oregon State University -- Glider Resources 2026
     https://gliderfs2.oce.orst.edu/gliderweb/slocumgliders.php

[16] G3S Glider Operator Manual 2025
     https://gliderfs2.oce.orst.edu/gliderweb/docs/slocum_manuals/
     G3S%20Glider%20Operator%20Manual%202025-07-18.pdf

[17] Slocum G3S Glider Operator Manual
     P/N M311172-NFC, Rev. A
     https://gliderfs2.coas.oregonstate.edu/gliderweb/docs/slocum_manuals/
     G3S%20Glider%20Operator%20Manual%202025-07-18.pdf

[18] SFMC Installation Guide [M313589-NFC, Rev B] Software Ver 8.7.0-1
     https://gliderfs2.oce.orst.edu/gliderweb/docs/slocum_manuals/
     SFMC%20Installation%20Guide%20[M313589-NFC,%20Rev%20B]
     %20Software%20Ver%208.7.0-1.pdf


============================================================================

                                  [ EOF ]

             Amitay Dan -- June 2026 -- Responsible Disclosure
                      amitaydan.com | x.com/popshark1

============================================================================