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Current issue : #73 | Release date : 2026-11-17 | Editor : Phrack Staff
IntroductionPhrack Staff
Phrack Prophile on Halvar FlakePhrack Staff
LinenoisePhrack Staff
Escaping from a Docker container through vDSOandersonc0d3
Owning the Truth: Undecidability, unsound kernels, and the forging of proofendrazine, veorq
Cryptographic Ideas for TCC BypassesJonathan Bar Or
Word Machines for Weird Machinesnoperator
Beyond the Facade :: Exposing Smart GiantsLiquidWorm
The Art of Staying HiddenMatheuZSecurity
Reflections on Trusting AI: A Virus Inside an LLMmarver
QNX Userland Shellcode ComponentsClaes M Sjoberg
UAF Exploitation in the Sheaves Eraw1sdom
From PhrackCTF to Two WinFsp 0-daysLucas Tay
fortify-headers: standalone portable header-based implementation of FORTIFY_SOURCE=3jvoisin, sin
Poor Little ChunksAx
The Silent Fleet: AUVs -- Autonomous Underwater VehiclesAmitay Dan
MOLE - A Binary Ninja Plugin for Static Taint AnalysisDamian Pfammatter
Backdoor attacks against Machine Learning IRLG. Cherubin
A Journey Into Kernel Exploit Development in the LLM EraJuefei Pu, Yifan Wu, Kareem Shehada, Zhiyun Qian
Abusing the Windows Smart Card Minidriver ArchitectureMarc Barrantes
Painting Out of the Box: Escaping the Chromium Renderer Sandbox via SkiaQuang Luong
Semantic Abuse of the Linux IIO SubsystemSalah Triki
Disassembly, Flux, and Runtime Hijinksfoosc
Mystique - An x86 Metamorphic CompilerwK
Security is failure: Every Patch Is a GuessTedsig42
The Moon vs The Shield: A Study of Heap Feng Shui Using Lua3nso
HISTORY: Phrack World HistoryPhrack Staff
HISTORY: The 2000 SSH1 exploit that broke the Internetlcamtuf, scut, dvorak, scrippie, portal, gera, skyper
HISTORY: The 2003 Linux Kernel BackdoorAnonymous
HISTORY: BlueBoxing - Myths and Feelingsgamma, skyper
HISTORY: The Proxy That Made No SenseMikko Hypponen

Title : HISTORY: The 2000 SSH1 exploit that broke the Internet

Author : lcamtuf, scut, dvorak, scrippie, portal, gera, skyper
View as text
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=----------=[ The 2000 SSH1 exploit that broke the Internet ]=----------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=------=[ lcamtuf, scut, dvorak, scrippie, portal, gera, skyper ]=------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|


--[ The 2000 SSH1 CRC32 RCE - CVE-2001-0144



This is the inside story of the ultimate exploit: one that allowed its wielder to get ROOT on most of the Internet.




 "Every server was vulnerable. Remote, pre-auth, instant-root on all
         default-installs - the four words of the apocalypse."
                                                          -- unknown


...and how hackers' gallantry and etiquette prevented wider damage.



..written by the hackers who found the vulnerability and wrote the exploit.




 =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
$ ./sshexp 1.2.3.4 -t 0

linux/x86 sshd1 exploit by zip/TESO ([email protected]) - ripped from
openssh 2.2.0 src

greets: mray, random, big t, sh1fty, scut, dvorak
ps. this sploit already owned cia.gov :/

...........................
bruteforced distance: 0x3200
bruteforcing distance from h->partial packet buffer on stack
..............^[[A................|////////\\\\!
bruteforced h->ident buff distance: 5bfbed88

trying retloc_delta: 35
....!
found high words of possible return address: 808
trying to exploit
....
trying retloc_delta: 37
.!
 =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=



---[ 1998 - How to add a vulnerability to SSH



In the late 1990s, SSH was rather new. System administrators were still
contemplating whether they should drop Telnet in favour of SSH. Then, in
1998, CoreSDI found a vulnerability in the SSH1 protocol: a minor bug and
not an RCE [#1].



CoreSDI created a patch and sent it to Tatu Ylonen, the inventor of the
Secure Shell. The patch added a function called "detect_attack()" to fix the
vulnerability but the SSH maintainers made a fatal change to the original
patch:




- static uint32_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
+ static word16 n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;


This broke the Internet.



A fix to an earlier bug introduced a worse vulnerability.



Cisco, OpenSSH and many others merged Tatu's patch into their source tree.
The vulnerability spread. Nobody checked. Nobody noticed.



(27 years later, Phrack Staff prophiled Gera, co-founder of CoreSDI [#2].)



---[ 2000 - Lcamtuf crashes SSH



Fast-forwarding to 2000: SSH was the new Telnet. The vulnerable SSH
patch was now widely deployed across the Internet. A talented young
hacker by the name of "lcamtuf" (from dione.ids.pl, the famous Polish
shell-site for like-minded hackers) was working on the first fuzzing
tool (the predecessor of the original American Fuzzy Lop, aka "AFL").



He runs it against SSH ... and SSH immediately crashes.



The hacker later became better known as Michal Zalewski.




---[ The only available disclosure



In 2000, the security industry was in its infancy (#non-existing or #lame).



Michal Zalewski was already working at BindView's RAZOR team at the time
but vulnerabilities were discussed on IRC (where else?), in private groups,
and among like-minded hackers. It was Stealth and Teso-adjacent circles
that first saw the potential of this "beautiful" bug.



Various researchers started working on an exploit before the vulnerability
was officially fixed.



"The crc32 exploit was particularly difficult. You had to brute the 
 correct offsets and the shellcode had to survive the crc32 check."
                                                           -- scut

There was in-depth collaboration among these groups. The very first PoC was
done by scut/team-teso (7350communicate). It overwrote the 16 most
significant bits of the 32-bit return address. The connect-back shell
code had to be split into multiple chunks.



Eventually, dvorak/synnergy found a way to stop the "loop" and survive the
crc32 check (aka "the minefield"). This was a major improvement as it
allowed for longer and continous shell-code: A 64k nop sled to land in
(more reliable), followed by a shell code that would drop straight into
/bin/sh.



A friend of dvorak named this exploit the "x2".



The source code was only shared with a select few. However, the pre-compiled
ELF binary of the exploit was more widely shared with fellow hackers.



The source code of the early alpha version and the final x2 source code have
now been published for the first time [#3]:



https://github.com/hackerschoice/team-teso/tree/main/exploits/ssh-crc32



The exploit needed precise offsets to work. Each combination of Linux
distribution and SSH version required a different set of offsets.



             "The offsets became a tradeable asset."

We traded offsets. A good list of working offsets was more valuable than the
x2 exploit itself.



Later, dvorak added offset.sh, a script that would get the offsets
automatically and mail them back to him. It was supposed to be run on
the target but many hackers ran it on their workstation first.



The exploit was later modified to work against BSD and Solaris (but never
publicly released).




---[ Technical



(I keep this short and only what's historically relevant)



  • There was no ASLR ("the good old times").

  • The heap was always at the same base address (on a given system).

  • For the exploit to work, SSH needed to receive the entire payload via a
    single syscall. TCP Fragmentation was used to "stuff the remote TCP
    buffer" before the final fragment "pushed" one huge motherlode of a
    payload to the SSH daemon process. As far as we know, this was the first
    time this trick has been used.

  • Some brute forcing still needed to be done. It caused the SSHD to crash
    and restart. Normally, not a problem unless you were targeting systems
    running the grsecurity hardened Linux kernel (crashing services is an
    indicator of an attack - so grsec stopped the service before the exploit
    worked).

  • It was a complex puzzle: The exploit overwrote data before the vulnerable
    function returned (i.e. before the shellcode could run). We nick-named it
    the "Minefield": The payload/shellcode had to survive the crc32 check.
    (iirc, a combination of brute force & educated guesses was used).




---[ Fixes



The vulnerability was finally fixed in November 2000 with the release of
OpenSSH 2.3.0.



The first advisory was published four months later, on the 8th of February
2001 [#4][#5]. Most servers did not update OpenSSH and the Internet remained
vulnerable for many months (and years).



Team-Teso released a statement in April 2001 [#9], trying to caution the
community.



By the time the Dutch hacker camp HAL2001 happened, the exploit was widely
used.



The CERT finally releases VU#945216 in October 2001 [#6]. Followed by
CA-2001-35 in December 2001, with a warning that the vulnerability was being
exploited in the wild [#7][#8].




---[ Commercial use and rumours



Unfortunately, and much later, the x2 binary leaked to malicious hackers
[#9]. Some x2 binaries were fake and others were infected with viruses.



The virus would give the malicious hacker access to the workstation
of whoever used it.



Eventually, one of those infected x2 binaries ended up in the hands of
an early pen-testing @company.



One of their key employees uses the infected x2 ... and gets 0wned.



The employee's password was "whisk3yp1" - a reference to a b0ston cocktail
bar called "Whiskey Park".




---[ Comments



  • Notable are the many months that passed between discovery, vendor fix,
    advisory, and wider exploitation. These days this takes hours
    or weeks at most, and not months or years.

  • There was no marketplace for exploits ("the good old times").

  • The exploit developers were driven by intellectual stimulation to show
    their prowess, not by greed, criminal intent, or a political agenda.

  • The unintended, widespread leak of the exploit and the resulting damage
    encouraged Team-Teso to develop "Burneye", the very first runtime ELF
    obfuscator. It locked the exploit binary to a single host so that it could
    not be copied or used by others.

  • The SSH1-CRC32 attack became part of the SANS training courses [#10] and
    was also featured in the movie "Matrix Reloaded" [#11,#12], along with
    nmap.

  • This bug contributed to the industry's push away from SSH1 toward SSH2.




---[ SSH CRC32 references




  1. https://www.coresecurity.com/sites/default/files/private-files/publications/2016/05/KargiemanPacettiRicharte_1998-CRC32.pdf
  2. Phrack Prophile of Gera, co-founder of CoreSDI - https://phrack.org/issues/72/2
  3. https://github.com/hackerschoice/team-teso/tree/main/exploits/ssh-crc32
  4. CoreSDI - https://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=98168366406903&w=2
  5. Bindview - https://web.archive.org/web/20010213194623/http://razor.bindview.com/publish/advisories/adv_ssh1crc.html
  6. https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/945216
  7. https://static.lwn.net/2001/1115/a/ssh-exploit.php3
  8. https://static.lwn.net/2001/1220/a/CertOnSSH.php3
  9. https://web.archive.org/web/20040407040018/http://www.team-teso.net/sshd_statement.php
  10. https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/295/exploiting-ssh-crc32-compensation-attack-detector-vulnerability/103026
  11. https://www.reddit.com/r/MovieDetails/comments/7s2qem/matrix_reloaded_using_the_real_crc32_exploit_to/?rdt=52769
  12. https://nmap.org/movies/



|=-------------------------------------------------------------------------------=|



|=[ EOF ]=---------------------------------------------------------------=|